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Article 9

UNITED KINGDOM PENSIONS LAW REFORM*
George Walker'
INTRODUCTION

The provision of an adequate level of retirement income
for all members of society has become an accepted absolute
minimum principle in all Western and developed economies as
well as in many other parts of the world. Despite the large
amount of important work which has been carried out in this
area and the significant recent progress achieved, a number of
difficulties continue to arise with regard to the provision of
proper support in all cases.'
The increasingly detailed and complex nature, as well as
dated structure of most national pension systems, as well as
the often archaic larger Social Security frameworks within
which they operate,2 can be criticised for failing both to create
proper saving mechanisms for those in employment and to
provide a sufficient level of support for those who are not.

Significant problems also arise with regard to funding
structures as many national state systems continue to operate
3
on a pay-as-you-go, as opposed to funded, basis. With a signif-
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1 See, for example, David W. Kalisch & Tetsuya Aman, Retirement Income
Systems: The Reform Process Across OECD Countries, in AGEING WORKING PAPERS:
MAINTAINING PROSPERITY IN AN AGEING SOCIETY: THE OECD STUDY ON THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF AGEING, Working Paper 3.4 (1998), prepared as part of the
OECD's study on the policy implications of ageing.
2 In connection with the relationship between pension and Social Security
reform see, for example, Jean-Victor Gruat, Adequacy and Social Security Principles in Pension Reform, in AGEING WORKING PAPERS: MAINTAINING PROSPERITY IN
AN AGEING SOCIETY: THE OECD STUDY ON THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF AGEING,

Working Paper 3.1 (1998).
' This means that pensions claims, at any one time, are paid through the
immediate transfer of funds from those currently in employment. Pensions pay-
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icant increase in the dependency ratio expected as a result of
future demographic changes, 4 a funding crisis will necessarily
arise in many countries which will require either that taxes be
substantially increased or pension benefits correspondingly
reduced. Further difficulties may also continue to arise with
regard to administrative waste and inequitable coverage and
treatment. 5
As a result of growing pressures for reform, the structure
and operation of pension systems in most industrialised and
emerging countries are currently subject to extensive examination and review.6 A number of difficult issues, however, arise
in attempting to ensure that any particular pension arrangement, or set of connected arrangements, operates in as effective a manner as possible and, in particular, in a way that
protects all of the different, and often conflicting, interests of
all members of society.
To deal with the large number of issues and complex range
of interests involved, many modern pension systems operate
through a number of separate but connected payment or benefit mechanisms. These may include, for example, a minimum
first tier state pension facility as well as a more generous second tier earnings-related scheme.7 Alternative second tier pro-

ments then operate as a charge on the current workforce. The opposite of a payas-you-go system is funded provision under which each generation provides for its
own future entitlement through a process of continued saving and capital accumulation. See, e.g., G. A. MACKENZIE ET AL., PENSION REGIMES AND SAVING 6 (IMF
Occasional Paper No. 153, 1997). For further discussion, see infra note 13.
This is the ratio between the number of people entitled to pension benefits
to the number of individuals of working age who contribute to the state system at
any one time. The difficulty which arises is that as a larger proportion of society
retires, the costs of funding imposed on current employees must be increased, failing which the amount of benefit provided must be reduced. See, e.g., David Blake
& J.M. Orszag, Towards a Universal Funded Second Pension: A Submission for the
1997 Pensions Review Focusing on the Financial Aspects of the Provision of a Second Tier Funded Pension (Oct. 1997). On the issue generally, see SHEETAL L
CHAND & ALBERT JAEGER, AGEING POPULATIONS AND PUBLIC PENSION SCHEMES
(IMF Occasional Paper No. 147, 1996).
See, e.g., MACKENZIE ET AL., supra note 3, at 1.
6 See, e.g., MACKENZIE ET AL., supra note 3; Kalisch & Aman, supra note 1.
' Many
public pensions operate on a flat-rate basis with residence and/or
means testing criteria used for determining benefit eligibility. This may or may
not require prior contribution with the state covering the additional costs involved.
Earnings-related schemes require that contributions be made over a minimum
period. See Kalisch & Aman, supra note 1, at paras. 2, 16-32.
Most public pension plans operate on a defined benefit, as opposed to defined
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vision may be in place with further third tier or supplementary
savings mechanisms made available for higher earners. The
interests of those not in employment may then have to be
protected through separate state operated benefit structures.
The most appropriate mix of mechanisms in any particular
country will necessarily depend upon both the historical development of its local economic and fiscal structures as well as
the political and social culture.
Whatever system is in place, proper entitlement rules and
funding arrangements must be established. Whether funds are
managed within the public or private spheres, all schemes
must be subject to proper supervision and control either in
accordance with general principles of law or more specific statutory direction. Moreover, beneficiaries must have ready and
affordable rights of proper redress in the event of malpractice
in the administration of a scheme as well as possible compensation or other support facilities in the event of loss. It is in
these particular areas that the law has an important continuing role to play in the development of effective pension systems
and their future reform.
In the United Kingdom, first tier payments are made under the basic state pension scheme with second tier benefits
contribution, basis. This means that the pension provision received will be calculated giving consideration to certain fixed criteria such as salary and work history.
Under a defined contribution scheme, the pension holder will receive the value of
any specific contributions made plus accumulated returns which will generally be
paid out in a single, or number of, lump sum(s) or through an annuity. See
MACKENZIE ET AL., supra note 3, at 6.

which
8 The state pension is paid for out of the National Insurance Fund to
contributions are made through national insurance payments. National insurance
contributions are levied according to earnings with a lower earning limit ("LEL")
below which no contribution is made. Above the LEL, contributions are paid by
employees on all earnings up to the upper earnings limit ("UEL"). The LEL is
currently £56 per week or 18% of gross average earnings for adult workers with
the UEL being set at between 7 and 7 112 times of the LEL. The basic pension is
paid depending upon contribution record with a maximum requirement of 44 years
out of 49 for a man and 39 years out of 44 for a woman which represents 90% of
their working lives. This will be equalised beginning in 2020. Proportionately less
payments are made with respect to shorter record periods subject to a minimum
entitlement of 114 of the full rate. The basic pension is paid at a flat rate of
£66.75 per week with a higher dependant's pension being paid of £106.70 per
week for a married couple. Currently, 86% of men and 49% of women qualify for
the full basic pension with 10.6 million pensioners making claims which cost the
government about £32 billion each year. See A NEW CONTRACT FOR WELFARE:
PARTNERSHIP IN PENSIONS, 1998, Cmnd. 4179, at ch. 2, paras. 13-14 [hereinafter
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made available through either the compulsory contributive
state Earnings-Related Pension Scheme ("SERPS")9 or by contracting out into either an occupational or private pension
scheme. People with few savings and no pension entitlements
are eligible for benefits in the form of income support, housing
or other benefits under the larger Social Security arrangements administered by the Department of Social Security
1o
("DSS").
The development of occupational schemes has been particularly successful in the United Kingdom, with over 10 million
employees currently members." The total market value of the
assets of all occupational schemes is now in excess of £640
billion.12 These schemes may be either earnings related or
money purchase schemes although some hybrid forms are also
available." Contributions to occupational pension schemes
GREEN PAPER]; PENSION LAW REFORM-THE REPORT OF THE PENSION REVIEW COMMITTEE, 1993, Cmnd. 2342, at vol. I, ch. 2.5 [hereinafter GOODE REPORT]; see also
ROBIN ELLISON, PENSIONS LAW AND PRACTICE ch. 3 (Release 21, Feb. 1998).
" SERPS was set up in 1978 but revised under the Social Security Act of
1986. Payments are related to earnings between the LEL and UEL for each year
of pensionable employment. For retirement before the year 2000, SERPS will be
1.25% of total salary (adjusted for inflation) between the LEL and UEL in each of
the best 20 years of employment. This will result in a maximum pension of 25%
of an individual's average pay over the 20 year period. After the year 2000, progressive reductions will take place over the subsequent 10 years to 20% of average
pay. See GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at paras. 2.5.13-2.5.20; ELLISON, supra note
8, at chs. 5, 6, 7; RICHARD NOBLES, PENSIONS, EMPLOYMENT AND THE LAW ch. 1
(1993).
o For a list of current entitlements, see DSS web site.
" In 1981, 10.7 million employees were participants which included 6.8 million
men and 3.9 million women. Of this, 6.5 million were involved with private sector
schemes with 4.2 million in public sector schemes. Although over 70% of public
sector employees were scheme members, only 40% participated in private schemes.
The total figures involved then represented just under half of the employed working population. See GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 2.2.4. Of the 35 million
people of working age in the United Kingdom, only about 10.5 million are currently members of occupational schemes. This represents less than one-third of the
employed working population. See GREEN PAPER, supra note 8, at ch. 2, para. 15.
12 See GREEN PAPER, supra note 8, at ch. 2, para. 21.
's The majority of occupational schemes are now salary-related or defined benefit rather than defined contribution. See supra note 7. The number of defined contribution or money purchase schemes has, however, grown from 100,000 in the
1970s to over 1 million by 1998. See GREEN PAPER, supra note 8, at ch. 2, para.
15. An earnings-related scheme (or final salary or defined benefit schemes) provides that benefits be directly related to member's former earnings. Such schemes
generally provide for 1/60th or 1/80th of the final salary of pensionable employment. See, e.g., GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, para. 2.2.12. Such schemes may also
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may also be increased by individual employees either by making additional voluntary contributions ("AVCs") or by making
4
free-standing additional voluntary contributions ("FSAVCs").'
Apart from occupational schemes, employees or self-employed
persons are also free to participate in one of a large range of
personal pension schemes. 5
Despite the relative success of the U.K. pensions system to
date, there have been increasing calls for reform of both the
structure of entitlements currently in place and the methods of
funding adopted. 6 Such calls have arisen partly as a result of
specific instances of malpractice or abuse such as the Maxwell
pensions fund scandal' or the more recent pensions mis-selling, the implications and effects of which have still not been
fully resolved.' The system is also very complex, which raises

ment. See, e.g., GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, para. 2.2.12. Such schemes may also
be referred to as funded or capitalisation schemes insofar as a sum of money is
set aside every year to be invested for provision of future retirement income.
"' Schemes are required to permit members to make AVCs under the Social
Security Act of 1986, section 12, subject to special exclusion such as those listed
under the Pension Schemes (Voluntary Contributions Requirements and Voluntary
and Compulsory Membership) Regulations of 1987 (SI 1987/1108), Reg. 2. Under a
FSAVC arrangement, the additional pension provision is dealt with apart from the
occupational pension scheme through a separately approved provider such as an
insurance company, bank, building society or unit trust company. See GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 2.5.5.
1" Individual pension provision for those not in pensionable employment or for
the self-employed was formally available through retirement annuity contracts
under Section 226 of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act of 1970 ("ICTA") (now
section 618 of the ICTA). Since 1 July 1988, such "Section 226" annuity contracts
have no longer been available. Currently, over 5 million personal pensions are
held within the United Kingdom. These were encouraged as a result of the prohibition by the Social Security Act of 1986 on making membership in an occupational scheme a condition for employment, the possibility of transferring benefits from
an occupational to a personal pension scheme and the ability to contract out of
SERPS with the contracted-out rebate being used to fund the personal pension. It
is generally not possible to be a member of an occupational and a personal pension scheme at the same time except where the occupational scheme is not contracted out of SERPS or the scheme is non-contributory. Personal pension schemes
are also attractive due to the more generous limits permitted with regards to
contributions which vary from 171/2% of earnings for persons under the age of 35
to 40% for persons aged 61 or over. See GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at paras.
2.5.8-2.5.12; ELLISON, supra note 8, at ch. 4.
"' See, e.g., GREEN PAPER, supra note 8, at ch. 2. For a review of recent developments in this area, see infra Section VI.
17 See infra Section II.
* See, e.g., Richard Nobles & Julia Black, Pensions Mis-Selling-The Lessons for
Regulating Privatised Social Security, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 933 (1998).
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exceptionally large number of options available confuses interested parties and, to a large extent, acts as a disincentive to
scheme participation." The economic effectiveness of current
structures has also been criticised at the same time as there
has been a more general growing political concern with the
adequacy and fairness of the present system, especially for the
poorest sections of society.
The purpose of this Article is to outline the historical development of the basic pensions system in the United Kingdom. Part I will examine its early historical development. In
Part II the limitations in the current structures of control
which were highlighted by the recent Maxwell pensions fund
scandal will be considered, and Part III will note the initial
proposals issued by the House of Commons Select Committee.
Part IV will examine in greater detail the specific recommendations of the separate special review body, the Goode Committee, which was set up in response to the Maxwell scandal.
The relevance of the new provisions introduced under the Pensions Act of 1995 will be considered in Part V and their importance and value assessed. In Parts VI and VII, subsequent
pressures for reform will also be noted including the
government's most recent proposals for a more substantial
revision of the present arrangements which were set out in its
December 1998 Green Paper." This Article will conclude with
some final observations and comments with regard to the present state of pension reform in the United Kingdom.

I. EARLY HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Early forms of occupational arrangements considerably
pre-dated the state's assumption of responsibility for pension
provision. The development of retirement provision and retirement age requirements were, however, both comparatively
recent. Basic retirement schemes were originally developed by
the state similar to the Customs and Excise Superannuation
Scheme in the 17th Century. There was, however, neither a
compulsory retirement age for civil servants until the early
1800s nor a limit placed on private sector retirement until the
19 See
20 See

Blake & Orszag, supra note 4, at ch. 1.
GREEN PAPER, supra note 8.
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1890s. Apart from family support, former employees depended
upon ex gratia payments, failing which the workhouse. 2 ' In
addition, although the state was responsible for the early development of many occupational schemes, proper state provision did not begin until the beginning of the 20th Century.
Similarly, the significant development of personal pension
schemes in addition to, or in place of, other primary and secondary tier arrangements began only recently in the 1980s.
A. Occupation Pension Schemes
While various forms of pension provision have ancient
origins," early forms of occupational pension schemes date
from the guild systems in the 15th Century, with modern
forms of scheme arrangement dating from the 17th Century.'
The first organised provision of occupational pensions was
established by Her Majesty's Customs and Excise in 1686
when the Lord High Treasurer required officers to pay 3p in
the pound of their salary by way of contribution to a pension
fund. Graded payments were then made on retirement after at
least 7 years of service (or earlier if retirement was caused by
occupational injury). The first private sector pension scheme
was set up in 1770 by Lord Clive, the governor of Bengal, by
way of a trust fund for relief of military personnel invalidated
from the East India Company's service and their widows. Insurance and life assurance schemes were also introduced during the 18th Century and were accompanied by early studies
in actuarial methods with the Institute of Actuaries subsequently being formed in 1848.'
A comprehensive scheme for civil servants was set up in
1810 with the age for retirement set at 60 and a final salaryrelated scheme of payment.26 Due to the high costs involved,
See LESLIE HANNAH, INVENTING RETIREMENT (1986); GOODE REPORT, supra
note 8, at para. 2.1.1. See generally GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at ch. 2.1; DAvD BLAKE, PENSION SCHEMES AND PENSION FUNDS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM ch. 1
(1995); ANTHONY M. REARDON, PENSIONS HANDBOOK ch. 2 (6th ed. 1997).
' See, for example, discussion by Ellison with regard to the payments made by
Darius, the King of the Persians, by way of military reward. ELLISON, supra note
8, at para. 1.010.
2 See ELLISON, supra note 8, at para. 1.012.
24 See GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 2.1.4.
2 See GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at paras. 2.1.5, 2.1.6.
26 The objective was to replace the corrupt system of sinecures and other per21
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related scheme of payment.26 Due to the high costs involved,
civil servants were required to make contributions beginning
in 1822 although this practice was abolished by statute in
1824.27 Thereafter, a contributory scheme for male civil servants was introduced under the Superannuation Act of 1834
which provided for a pension of two-thirds of an employee's
final salary following 45 years of service. A definitive scheme
was subsequently established following the 1856 Report of the
Select Committee on Civil Service Superannuation. The civil
service arrangements in place under this scheme were subsequently replaced, however, in 1859 by a modern form of benefits which provided for 1/60th of an employee's final salary for
each year of service up to a maximum of 40/60ths. Private
schemes modelled on such civil service arrangements were
subsequently set up in other areas including teaching,2 8 the
railway companies,2 9 the Bank of England and the East India
Company.3 ° By 1900, one million people, or 5 percent of the
workforce, were members of occupational pension schemes.
Such members were generally comprised of managerial staff,
26 The objective was to replace the corrupt system of sinecures and other per-

quisites of office with an open and orderly organised scheme, to reward loyal service and to promote efficiency by pensioning off older staff. See GERALD RHODES,
PUBLIC SECTOR PENSIONS (1952).
2 The Treasury nevertheless issued a minute in 1829 requiring deductions
from new appointees' salary by way of pension contribution although a bill to
implement this was later withdrawn and the practice discontinued. See GOODE
REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 2.1.8.
28 An initial money purchase scheme was set up under the Elementary School
Teachers (Superannuation) Act of 1898. This was replaced by a final salary
scheme under the School Teachers (Superannuation) Act of 1918. See GOODE
REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 2.1.10.
" Railway schemes developed to provide pensions for managerial and clerical
workers with other workers being supported through saving clubs, friendly societies and other self-help organisations. For example, the Provident Society was established by the Great Western Railway in 1838 to provide pension provisions for
those unable to work due to sickness, accident or old age. The London & Birmingham Railway Company introduced a form of wage contribution-based scheme in
1853 following an earlier allowances system. The London & North Western Railway Superannuation Fund was also set up in the 1850s along with the Railway
Clearing System Superannuation Fund Association in 1873. This provided for the
first multiple employer final salary superannuation scheme. See GOODE REPORT,
supra note 8, at paras. 2.1.11-2.1.14.
"0 The Gas Light & Coke Company, for example, set up staff and manual
workers schemes in 1842 and 1870. Similar schemes were set up by the Prudential Assurance Company in 1866, Siemens Brothers in 1872 and the Royal Exchange in 1880. See GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 2.1.15.
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and friendly societies.3 ' Although many of these private
schemes were modelled on the civil service arrangements,
similar benefits were not provided, and the governing philosophy was still one of funds being provided by way of gratuitous
provision rather than entitlement.3 2
By the beginning of the 20th Century, the approach adopted had changed to one of enlightened self-interest and common
business sense. This metamorphosis had occurred as a result
of the introduction of the first state pension provision scheme
under the Old Age Pensions Act of 1908."' In 1909 the civil
service scheme was amended to assume its modern form following the Courtney Commission Report in 1903."4 The development of occupational schemes was further strengthened with
the introduction of additional tax relieves, especially those
introduced under the Finance Act of 1921."5 Although some
concerns arose in the 1920s with regard to trusts breaching the
rule against perpetuities, legislation was introduced in 1927 to
exempt qualifying occupational pension schemes which had not
already made any necessary adjustments. 36 During the 1930s
and 1940s, the provision of occupational pensions through
insured schemes grew substantially as life offices offered employers, first, individual pension policies and, subsequently,
group policies-which benefited from economies of scale, lower
premiums, ease of administration and increased spread of
risk. 7 In May 1938 the Ministry of Labour conducted the first
31 See GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 2.1.17.
32

See ELLISON, supra note 8, at para. 1.014.

3 See GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 2.1.18.
"' The basis of entitlement was set at 1/80th of final salary for every year of
service with a cash payment of 3/80th of final salary subject to a maximum of 40
years of pensionable service. See GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 2.1.19.
' This introduced a statutory right to tax relief on contributions made to pension funds by employers and employees and on the investment income of approved
pension funds. This followed the recommendations of the earlier REPORT OF THE
ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE INCOME TAX, 1903, Cd. 615. See GOODE REPORT,
supra note 8, at 2.1.20.
3 See Superannuation and Other Funds (Validation) Act of 1927. General exemption was subsequently provided under Section 69 of the Social Security Act of
1973. Concerns with regard to the rule against perpetuities continued, for example,
until 1970. See, e.g., GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 2.1.24 (citing Re
Thomas Meadows & Co. Ltd. and Subsidiary Companies (1960); STAFF PENSION
SCHEME RULES ch. 278 (1971)).
3" These occupational pension schemes developed from 20% to over 50% of the
market. See GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 2.1.24.
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comprehensive survey of occupational pension schemes.3 8 The
popularity of occupational pension schemes was stimulated
again .during the 1940s as a result of high levels of taxation
and a wider tax base. Some action was taken by the Inland
Revenue, however, to limit tax avoidance through the introduction of restrictions on employee contributions to 15 percent of
an employee's total salary, limits on the amount of lump sum
benefits payable by insurance company schemes and limits on
private schemes, restricting them strictly to the provision of
benefits similar to public sector schemes.3 9
During the post-War period, the structure and nature of
pension provision was examined by a number of bodies, and
various recommendations for reform were made. One particularly difficult area which was identified was the increasingly
complex tax treatment of pension schemes. Despite calls for
the introduction of a simple and coherent tax treatment of
funds, little substantial progress was achieved under the Income Tax Act of 1952 which only codified existing provision.
Similarly, little progress was achieved under the Finance Act
of 1956 which extended tax relief to the self-employed and
exempted annuity contract investments under section 32 of the
Finance Act of 1921.40 In 1954 the Phillips Committee noted
" Specifically, 6,544 employers provided pension schemes of which 4,944 were

confined to the administrative and professional classes and to clerical, sales and
similar staff. The total number of employees covered was 1.6 million of the 3
million who worked for the firms concerned. Almost two-thirds of the pension
schemes were group based although the membership was very small. See GOODE
REPORT, supra note 8, at paras. 2.1.25-2.1.26; ELLISON, supra note 8, at para.
1.017.
"' These requirements were introduced under the Finance Act of 1947. See
GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at paras. 2.1.27-2.1.30.
"0 The main organisations concerned with pensions recommended the re-statement of relevant tax law in a simple and coherent form although this was not
followed. See Tax Treatment of Retirement Benefits: A Report Submitted to the
Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue by the Federation of British Industries,
the Association of British Chambers of Commerce, the Life Offices' Association and
the Association of Superannuation Funds. The matter was again considered by the
Millard Tucker Report in 1954 although there was still no attempt to construct an
appropriate new conceptual framework covering the taxation issues of all of the
different schemes involved. See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE TAXATION
TREATMENT OF PROVISIONS FOR RETIREMENT, 1954, Cmd. 9063. Following passage
of the Finance Act of 1956, pension benefits were provided under the Finance Act
of 1921 with lump sum benefits provided under the approved scheme provisions of
the Finance Act of 1947. See GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at paras. 2.1.312.1.32.
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the potential difficulties of financing the accelerating rate of
elderly dependency in society.4 ' Thus, while there already existed a tendency for employees to defer retirement during this
period, any subsequent attempts by the government to encourage this practice were rejected.42
During the 1950s and 1960s, a number of significant
changes occurred in the pensions industry especially with the
development of more actively-managed and equity-based investment portfolios" and an increase in competition between
self-administered schemes and insurance company pension
services. As the costs of pension provision increased and investment practices became more active, a number of larger
organisations set up self-administered schemes either managed
internally or through merchant bankers. This development led
to both a significant drop in the cost of premiums as well as a
large number of new management services being offered by
insurance companies in response to the increased competition
which had developed." Further, in 1958 the first full report
on pension provision was published by the Government
Actuary's Department, referencing schemes in place as of the
end of 1956." By this time, the idea of pensions as represent-

" See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS
OF THE PROVISION FOR OLD AGE, 1954, Cmd. 93333.
42 See REPORT OF AN ENQUIRY BY THE MINISTRY OF PENSIONS AND NATIONAL
INSURANCE, 1954.

' The introduction of alternative investment strategies was led by George Ross
Goobey at Imperial Tobacco Pension Fund. The Trustee Investment Act of 1961
also significantly relaxed the investment powers of trustees by allowing them to
transfer up to 50% of their portfolios to U.K. securities, building society shares
and units in authorised unit trusts. The first tax-exempt unit trust for pension
funds was set up in 1957. In addition to the growth of active management of
investments in these areas, pension funds also began to invest in property markets. See GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at paras. 2.1.34-2.1.36.
4 See GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 2.1.37.
45 See GOVERNMENT ACTUARY, OCCUPATIONAL PENSION SCHEMES: A SURVEY
(HMSO, 1958). This report was published in accordance with one of the recommendations of the Phillips Report. It showed that pension scheme membership had
increased from 13% in 1936 to 33% in 1956 with 4.3 million individuals in 37,500
private occupational schemes and 3.8 million in nationalised industries involved in
public sector schemes. Since 1958, similar surveys have been produced every four
years by the Government Actuary. See GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para.
2.1.39. By 1963, private scheme membership had spread to 7.2 million in 60,000
schemes. Considering the 3.9 million members of public schemes, 48% of the employed population was covered. By 1967, private scheme membership had increased
to 8.1 million with 4.1 million in public sector schemes. This represented the peak
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ing deferred pay rather than gratuity had also emerged.4 6
During the 1970s, a new simplified code for approval of
employee pension and life assurance benefits was introduced
under the Finance Act of 1970. This Act provided for the payment of a tax free lump sum from a fund which had grown tax
free, with benefits commensurate with civil service provision.47 Further improvements in the provision of state and
occupational pensions were then introduced from 1973 onwards
as part of larger developments in the Social Security system
within the United Kingdom. Specifically, preservation requirements to protect the accrued rights of early leavers were introduced under the Social Security Act of 1973. This Act also
established the Occupational Pension Board ("OPB") to approve occupational schemes and advise on compliance with the
new preservation rules.4 8 These provisions were largely reenacted under the Social Security Pensions Act of 1975 with
further information disclosure regulations being introduced in
1986. 49
Under the Social Security Acts of 1985 and 1986, early
leavers were given the option of transferring to new schemes
or having the value of their accrued benefits used to either
purchase a deferred annuity or invest in an appropriate personal pension scheme. Since 1986, preserved benefits were
required to be revalued in line with inflation subject to a statu-

of scheme participation with 53% of the employed population. A small decline in
scheme participation was noted in 1971. By 1987, the total number of scheme
participants had fallen to 10.6 million or 49% of the employed population. Although this number increased slightly to 10.7 million in 1991, this figure represented the same proportion of total employed as of 1987. See GOODE REPORT,
supra note 8, at paras. 2.1.41, 2.1.42.
4 For discussion, see GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 2.1.38.
4' The Act provided for employees to take a tax free lump sum of up to 11/2
times their final salary after a minimum of 20 years of service. Between 1950 and
the 1970s, a large number of schemes had elected to operate on a final salary
basis which both protected payments from inflation and encouraged early retirement. Such schemes rose from 8 to 10 million between 1971 and 1975. See GOODE
REPORT, supra note 8, at paras. 2.1.44, 2.1.40.
"' The Act also exempted approved schemes from the rule against perpetuities.
49 See OCCUPATIONAL PENSION SCHEMES (DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION) REGULATIONS 1986, SI 1986/1046. These followed a report by the OPB in 1981 and of the
DSS in 1983. See OPB, IMPROVED PROTECTION FOR THE OCCUPATIONAL PENSION

RIGHTS AND EXPECTATIONS OF EARLY LEAVERS, 1981, Cmnd. 8271; DSS, REPORT OF
THE WORKING GROUP ON THE LAW AND CONVENTIONS GOVERNING PENSION FUNDS,

1983.
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tory limit. Moreover, limited price indexation of the entire preserved pension has been required since 1 January 1991 under
the Social Security Act of 1990. The 1990 Act also set up the
Pensions Ombudsman and the Pensions Registry to allow deferred members to trace former schemes. Finally, increased
support provided to advisory bodies during this period led to
an expansion in the role of the Occupation Pensions Advisory
Service ("OPAS"). °
A further pension schemes bill was presented before Parliament during the 1992-3 session to complete the process of
consolidation of Social Security statutes which had begun with
the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act of 1992 and
the Social Security Administration Act of 1992. This was followed by the Pensions Act of 1995 which was passed to give
effect to various recommendations contained in the Goode
Report. As discussed earlier, the Goode Report was issued in
response to the circumstances surrounding the Maxwell pension scandal. Such scandal is considered in further detail infra
in Part I 5
B. State Provision
Despite the publication of a large number of reports with
recommendations for the introduction of some form of state
provision during the end of the 19th and the beginning of the
20th Century, it was not until 1908 that the first government
sponsored scheme was introduced. Until then, the individual
was assumed to be responsible for making proper provision for
his own illness and old age. The assumption of responsibility
by the state for pension provision was rejected by a number of
official reports during the 1890s despite a number of notable
figures such as Joseph Chamberlain, Canon William Blackley
and Charles Booth calling for pension reform.5 2

50 See GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at paras. 2.1.45-2.1.49.
"

See infra Section II.

52

See, e.g., REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITEE ON THE AGED DESERVING POOR,

1899, C. 296; REPORT OF THE COMMITEE ON OLD AGE PENSIONS, 1898, C. 8911;
REPORT OF THE ROTHSCHILD COMMISSION, 1898; REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMIS-

SION ON THE AGED LAWS, 1895, C. 7684; REPORT OF THE ABERDARE ROYAL COMMISSION, 1895; see also GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 2.1.54.
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The first pension scheme introduced only provided for five
shillings per week for individuals 70 years old and over. Moreover, these individuals were subject to a means and moral
character test. Compulsory health insurance was subsequently
introduced in 1911 under the National Insurance Act which
was administered by friendly societies. Means testing of the
basic provision was removed under the Pensions Act of 1925
with contributions being made compulsory for manual workers
and others earning less than £250 per year. Early provision
was, however, included to permit contracting out where members were adequately provided for by occupational pension
schemes. Finally, in 1928, benefits payable were adjusted to
ten shillings per week for persons aged 65 and over.
In 1942, a new unified plan for Social Security was introduced under the Beveridge Report.5 3 Under the Report, Sir
William Beveridge recommended that a flat-rate social insurance benefit be paid in all cases where an individual's earnings
had been interrupted by unemployment, disability or retirement. Such benefit provision was required to be sufficient to
provide the minimum amount of funds needed for an
individual's subsistence in all normal circumstances. Further,
the scheme was to be based on a single flat-rate contribution.
These provisions were given effect under the National Insurance Act of 1946 which provided for universal collection of
national insurance contributions and the introduction of benefit schemes for all U.K. employers and employees. While contracting out of the basic state provision was prohibited under
the 1946 Act, the National Insurance Act of 1959 allowed occupational schemes to assume responsibility for the new graduated retirement benefits introduced in 1961. This provided for
limited earnings-related payments. These payments, however,
were replaced by the Social Security Pensions Act of 1975
which introduced SERPS beginning in April 1978. Under
SERPS, national insurance contributions were payable with
reference to earnings bands. Specifically, pension benefits
were payable on 25 percent of average lifetime figures of earnings within the best 20 years of an individual's contribution
record. This percentage was subsequently reduced to a 20
percent figure under the Social Security Act of 1986 following a

'3 See SOCIAL INSURANCE AND ALLIED SERVICES, 1942, Cmd. 6404.
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review of Social Security provision by the incoming Conservative government in 1979. Contracting out of SERPS was also
permitted provided that a guaranteed minimum pension
("GMP") was provided under alternative occupational schemes.
For the first time, money purchase schemes and personal pensions
were also allowed to be used for contracting out purpos54
es.
By the early 1990s, the basic two-tiered structure of pension provision in the United Kingdom had been established.
Subsequent crises and an increasing awareness of the continuing importance, but new complexity, surrounding pension
structures would, however, begin to generate new calls for
reform.

II. THE MAXWELL PENSIONS FUND SCANDAL
Pension provision in the United Kingdom was subject to
substantial review following The Mirror Group pension scandal
in 1992 which involved the withdrawal of substantial assets
from existing pension funds. 5 Robert Maxwell purchased The
Mirror Group in 1984 and quickly imposed a pensions holiday.
A pensions holiday meant that the company did not make any
payments into the general pension fund of 141/2 percent of
each member's salary while employees continued to pay 6
percent from their wages." While not illegal in light of the
fund's surplus, this saved Maxwell from making over
£800,000,000 worth of contributions to the pension fund each
year. Maxwell also imposed a statutory minimum increase in
pensions of 3 percent and undertook to remove all hostile
trustees from the pension fund's board which included union
officials, workers' representatives and other unsupportive individuals.5 7
54 See GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at paras. 2.1.58-2.1.63.
" See, e.g., SOC. SEC. COMM., THE OPERATION OF PENSION FUNDS 61-Il (Mar.
1992) [hereinafter OPERATION OF FUNDS]; see also ROY GREENSLADE, MAXWELL:

THE RISE AND FALL OF ROBERT MAXWELL AND HIS EMPIRE ch. 14 (1992).
56 See GREENSLADE, supra note 55, at 253.
5 While there had originally been six trusteep from management and six from
unions when Maxwell acquired The Mirror Group, the union representatives were
subsequently replaced with more docile management figures. At the same time,
Maxwell reduced the quorum to allow meetings to be held with a minimum of two
people from 1986 onwards. From an early stage, other trustees were simply not
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While Maxwell originally appeared to lack any specific
intent to withdraw money from employees' pension funds, he
subsequently adopted a deliberate strategy of undermining the
independence of the trustees over a prolonged period of time.
This practice facilitated his later abuses. Surprisingly, although many of Maxwell's actions were described as unusual,
none were illegal at the time. In fact, despite concerns over the
operation of U.K. occupational schemes in general, precedent
involving employer tampering with employee pension funds
failed to exist.
As Chairman of The Mirror Group Pensions Trust,
Maxwell subsequently appointed one of his private trusts,
Bishopgate Investment Management, to act as manager of over
half the pension fund's assets. Following this, substantial investments were made by the pension fund in Maxwell connected companies. In June 1990, Maxwell instructed Larry
Trachtenberg, the Managing Director of London & Bishopsgate
International Investment Management, to place £100 million
worth of pension fund share certificates at his personal disposal.5" By December 1990 the pension fund surplus had risen
from £85 million in April 1988 to £149.3 million although difficulties had arisen in confirming the value of the assets since
complete accounts were not available.5 9
Beginning April of 1990, Maxwell began to withdraw funds
from the various pension schemes under his control through
Bishopsgate Investment Management of which he was chairman. At that time Bishopsgate Investment Management was
responsible for £700 million worth of assets. Such figure included 72 percent of the £200 million assets of the Maxwell
Communications Works pension scheme and 56 percent of The
Mirror Group pension fund. This compilation was achieved by
lending shares to two of Maxwell's other private companies,
The Robert Maxwell Group and Headington Investments, un-

invited to meetings. See GREENSLADE, supra note 55, at 254.
" Trachtenberg promptly delivered the certificates to Maxwell's office where he
deposited them in his personal safe. See GREENSLADE, supra note 55, at 254.
While Trachtenberg had not acted illegally in transferring the share certificates, he
had already been suspended from the board of London & Bishopsgate following a
stop-lending conflict which had arisen with the First Toyko Index Trust which
Maxwell had acquired in January 1989. See id. at 257.
"' See GREENSLADE, supra note 55, at 256.
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der supposedly legitimate stock lending operations (commonly
undertaken by pension funds). Rather than return the equivalent shares within a day, or a couple of days, however,
Maxwell used the securities as collateral for loans received
from a number of different banks. Moreover, instead of accounting for the proceeds of any share's sale to the pension
fund, Maxwell diverted monies received to other loss-making
activities. 0
After the scandal, it was confirmed that approximately
£420 million of assets had been withdrawn from various pension funds. Of this amount, approximately £235 million was
simply money owed by private Maxwell companies from securities sold by the pension fund.6 '
Although a number of people had become concerned about
the possible removal of assets from the pension funds, no action had been taken by the authorities. An Association of Mirror Pensioners had been established by Tony Boram, former
editorial director at The Mirror Group. By the beginning of
1990, this Association had uncovered a considerable amount of
evidence. It became further concerned with the amount of
money invested in Maxwell companies following the release of
the pension scheme's report and accounts for the year through
April 1990. Although attempts were made to draw this matter
to the attention of the press, no action was taken, partly as a
result of the fact that engaging the support of Maxwell-connected journalists (including those on The Mirror) proved difficult.62 Finally, despite referral of the matter to the Occupational Advisory Pension Service ("OPAS"), again no further
action was taken.63

"0 In one subsequent deal involving the purported acquisition of First Tokyo
Index Trust by a specially established Maxwell called "Adviser (188)," Maxwell bL rowed £60 million from the Swiss Bank Corporation. He then disposed of part of
the shares acquired contrary to an agreement with SBC and used part of the balance as collateral for loans acquired from Credit Suisse and Lehman Brothers. See
GREENSLADE, supra note 55, at 259-61.
1 This involved one transaction worth £100,000,000 concerning an unlisted Israeli company and various other disposals sold through Maxwell companies without the monies due being duly paid to the pension funds. See OPERATION OF
FUNDS, supra note 55, at para. 83.
' For comments, see, for example, OPERATION OF FUNDS, supra note 55, at
paras. 100-06.
' For criticism of the action of the OPAS, see OPERATION OF FUNDS, supra
note 55, at paras. 107-09.
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III. THE SOCIAL SECURrrY COMMITtEE
The House of Common's Social Security Committee" began investigating pension-related issues and, in particular, the
equalisation of pension ages prior to the Maxwell scandal.65
This inquiry was then extended to include the ownership and
control of pension assets in light of the circumstances surrounding the Maxwell affair.
In its Report, the Committee noted the improvements
which had been achieved in the provision of pensions this
century. It further recognised the complex nature of pensions
law and the difficulty of arriving at any simple, meaningful list
of reform proposals.66 The continued reliance on medieval
trust law as the core legal basis for pension law was severely
criticised, and the Committee stated that it thought that pension funds should be governed by laws analogous to those governing companies. In light of the complexity of the issues involved, the Committee recommended that a formal inquiry be
undertaken by the government during the following year to
collect relevant data supporting the detailed structure of a new
pensions act.67

" The Social Security Committee was appointed under SO No. 130 to examine
the expenditure, administration and policy of the DSS, associated public bodies
and other similar matters within the responsibilities of the Secretary of State for
Northern Ireland. The Committee was comprised of a maximum of 11 members of
which 3 was a quorum. The Committee had the power to send for persons, papers
and records, appoint technical experts to supply information or explain matters of
complexity, communicate with other committees regarding its evidence and meet
with any other such committees in deliberating, taking evidence or considering
draft reports.
65 This began with the decision of the European Court of Justice in the Barber
case. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
6 The Committee stated:
The issues involved in the ownership and control of pension funds are
very complex, and while the Committee does not pretend to have come to
a single mind on all aspects of pension reform, we do believe that there
is a need to change the legal basis on which pension funds operate ...
However, we believe that, given past errors, politicians should approach
reform with a certain degree of humility rather than pretend that they
are the possessors of a quick political panacea.
OPERATION OF FUNDS, supra note 55, at paras. 7, 8.
0 See OPERATION OF FUNDS, supra note 55, at para. 10. The operation and recommendations of the Goode Report which was subsequently published are considered in infra Section IV.

1998]

UNITED KINGDOM PENSIONS LAW REFORM

In addition to its core recommendation establishing a
review body, the Committee considered the legal under-pinning
of pension funds," conducted an interim examination of the
circumstances surrounding the Maxwell scandal,69 examined
the regulatory system governing pensions law in the United
Kingdom and commented on the governance of a number of
other pension funds in operation with various recommendations for reform being made.
The Committee expressed an urgent need for pensions law
reform and criticised the unquestionable inadequacy of trust
law as the legal basis supporting occupational pension
schemes.7" Moreover, it noted that a number of reforms had
already received widespread consensus and should be implemented. These reforms related to the greater safeguard of
investments, improved disclosure and information, monitoring
functions, the powers of trustees and certain other ancillary
matters.7

" The Committee noted the substantial growth of occupational pension
schemes. Almost 25 million people were members or beneficiaries of non-state
pension schemes; 19 million belonged to occupational schemes organised by their
employers with the remaining 4.6 million having personal pension plans. See SOCIAL SECURITY: THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPENDITURE PLANS 1992-1993 TO 1994-1995,
1992, Cmnd. 1914. The Committee noted the trust law basis of pension law and
four recent sources of official criticism. These critical sources were comprised of
documents obtained from the Committee established to review the functioning of
financial institutions which was chaired by Right Honorable Sir Harold Wilson,
Professor Gower's Green Paper on investor protection, Professor Gower's report to
the Secretary of State for Trade & Industry on the review of investor protection
and the Occupational Pension Board's 1982 Report. See REVIEW OF INVESTOR PROTECTION, 1984, Cmnd. 9125; OPB, 1982, Crnnd. 8649; REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
TO REVIEW THE FUNCTIONING OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, 1980, Cmnd. 7937; REVIEW OF INVESTOR PROTECTION: A DISCUSSION DOCUMENT (HMSO 1982).
" The Committee noted that the first public warning of the impending crisis
was the report in The Daily Mail on 24 October 1990 by Max Hotopf concerning
the investment of pension fund assets in Maxwell companies. A second report was
published on 18 May 1991 following the publication of the fund's accounts for the
year ending April 1990. This showed that £160,000,000, which represented the top
20 investments, were no longer in the top 100 public companies. Of these, the
only remaining investments were in Maxwell Communications. The Committee
noted the failure to register early warnings especially through the media and by
the OPAS. The Committee also examined the role of all of the different sets of
professional advisers involved and made various recommendations in this regard.
See OPERATION OF FUNDS, supra note 55, § 5.
70 See OPERATION OF FUNDS, supra note 55, at para. 282.
71 See OPERATION OF FUNDS, supra note 55, at paras. 286-90.
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The more general conclusions in the Committee's Report
were well received at the time. However, some of its more
specific recommendations, such as the replacement of existing
trust law with a new regulatory statute or the overburdensome

training of trustee's, were strongly criticised." Thus, in light
of the importance of the issues raised, the government agreed
to set up a further review body.
IV. THE PENSION LAW REVIEW COMMITTEE
Following receipt of the recommendations set forth in the
Social Security Committee Report, the Secretary of State for
Social Security announced the establishment of a new review
committee. The Pension Law Review Committee was established under the chairmanship of Professor Roy Goode in June
1992 and began working in July 1992.
The purpose of such Committee was to consider all aspects
of public and private sector occupational schemes, whether
funded or unfunded and whether contracted out or not, of state
earnings-related arrangements. The Committee was neither
directly concerned with state pensions nor personal pensions.
The Committee was also not concerned with the fiscal implications of pensions policy although some comments were made
on the possible adverse effects on scheme structure, security
and management.
While the Committee was aware of the large and complex
nature of occupational pensions, it noted that it was only during its work that it fully realised how difficult the area truly
was and the large number of differing views which existed
between employees and employees on the subject of pension
policy. The Committee further recognised the contribution
made by the OPB between 1975 and 1989 and, in particular,
the value of its major reports on the balance of employer and
employee interests, the involvement of pension schemes with
mergers and take-overs, trustee decision-making, the need for
restrictions on self-investment and other measures to safeguard the rights of scheme members.7 3

See, e.g., ELLISON, supra note 8, at para. 1.056.
See OPB, PROTECTING PENSIONS, SAFEGUARDING BENEFITS IN A CHANGING
ENVIRONMENT, 1989, Cmnd. 573; OPB, IMPROVED PROTECTION FOR THE OCCUPA72
73
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In its final report of September 1993, the Committee provided a critique of the basic pensions law and made a number
of recommendations for reform. The new regulatory structure
scheme proposed was, in particular, designed to satisfy four
essential criteria: fairness to all parties, security for scheme
members, practicality and the simplification of the law regulating occupational pension schemes and their administration.74
The recommendations of the Committee included six key
proposals:
(1) Trust law should continue to provide the foundation
for creating interests, rights and duties arising in connection
with occupational pension schemes although these should be
reinforced by a new pensions act administered by a pensions
regulator.
(2) Freedom of trust should be limited to ensure the reality of the pension promise, to protect rights accrued in respect
of past service and to allow members to make appointments to
the trustee board.
(3) The provision of information for scheme members
should be improved both in content and in clarity and presentation.
(4) The security of members' entitlements should be
strengthened by a minimum solvency requirement; monitoring
by the new pensions authority, scheme auditors and actuaries;
restrictions on withdrawals from surpluses; and a compensation scheme to cover scheme deficits arising from fraud, theft
or other misappropriations.
(5) When establishing a scheme, employers should be free
to reserve the right to close, freeze or wind-up schemes, to approve or refuse increases in benefits and to reduce or stop
contributions subject to the pre-set minimum solvency requirement.
(6) The administrative burdens imposed on employers and
scheme administrators should, wherever possible, be reduced

TIONAL PENSION RIGHTS AND EXPECTATIONS OF EARLY LEAVER, 1982, Cmnd. 8271;
OPB, OCCUPATIONAL PENSION SCHEMES COVER FOR DISABLED PEOPLE, 1977, Cmnd.
6849; OPB, EQUAL STATUS FOR MEN AND WOMEN IN OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS,
1976, Cmnd. 6599; OPB, SOLVENCY, DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION AND MEMBER
PARTICIPATION IN OCCUPATIONAL PENSION SCHEMES, 1975, Cmnd. 5904.
7' See GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 1.1.15.
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and flexibility increased through simplification of the law and
its administration.7 5
The Committee's basic critical analysis of the existing law
and the principal recommendations made for reform are set

forth below.
A. Inadequacies of the Present Law
The current law which was based on trust was believed to
suffer from a number of deficiencies especially with regard to
its considerable complexity and lack of structure and
organisation. Unnecessarily wide powers and discretions were
also conferred on employers and trustees with no final compensation being available in the event of asset misappropriation.
The reliance on general trust law also meant that there failed
to exist clear regulatory authority to monitor and enforce proper standards in the administration of occupational pension
schemes.7 6 The Committee, therefore, suggested that an Occupational Pension Schemes Act should be enacted to set out a
structured framework of rights and duties and a pensions
regulator appointed with overall responsibility for the regulation of occupational pension schemes.77

"' Detailed statutory investment rules should, in particular, be replaced with a
general prudent person standard and statutory investment criteria. Further, there
should be a rapid transition towards a single tax system, and there should be a
move from excessively detailed and obscurely-drafted rules towards more general,
clearly-expressed statements of principles. See GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at
para. 1.1.15.
See- GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.1.
The following particular recommendations were made: (1) An Occupational
Pension Schemes Act should be enacted to set out a structured framework of
rights and duties and a Pensions Regulator appointed with overall responsibility
for the regulation of occupational pension schemes. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8,
at para. 4.1.3. (2) Trust law was deemed generally satisfactory and should continue to provide the foundation for interests, rights and duties arising in relation to
pension schemes although some principles require modification in their application.
GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.1.14. (3) A shift in the permitted distribution of powers was deemed necessary, in particular, to protect scheme members
against adverse amendment of scheme rules affecting their rights to accrued service through the creation of non-excludable rights to participate in scheme management and decision-making and the provision of all necessary information in
both a readily understandable and full form upon request. GOODE REPORT, supra
note 8, at para. 4.1.18. (4) General statements of principle should be adopted in
primary legislation and the amount of detailed prescription reduced. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.1.25. (5) Statutory and other rules affecting pension
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B. Recommendations
The Committee further made the following specific recommendations with regard to various aspects of the operation,
administration and control of occupational pension schemes:
1. Defining and Protecting the Pension Promise
The Committee considered that employees belonging to
occupational pension schemes should have certain reasonable
expectations which should be protected under the law. The
Committee referred to these expectations as the "Pension
Promise." The Pension Promise was principally comprised of
accrued rights which meant that the benefits payable to
scheme members accrued with service and that their subsequent payment was protected.78 The Committee made four
specific recommendations in this regard.79
2. Interest in the Pension Fund and Surpluses
Particular difficulties had arisen in recent years concerning fund surpluses. These difficulties largely resulted from the
economic circumstances of the 1980s and changes in actuarial

schemes should be simplified and reduced in number. GOODE REPORT, supra note
8, at para. 4.1.26. (6) There should be a relatively small number of rules which
are vigorously enforced as against a larger proliferation of regulations which were
frequently breached through lack of adequate monitoring and enforcement. GOODE
REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.1.35.
" The Committee noted that these rights were not, at that time, strictly legal
especially as trust deeds gave employers and trustees wide powers of amendment.
It did, however, assert that it thought that these rights should nevertheless be
protected in law. See GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.2.2.
7 These recommendations were: (7) Certain limits should be set to freedom of
trust to preserve the reality of the pension promise especially in relation to accrued rights. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.2.8. (8) The proposed Pensions Act should clarify the scope of the employer's obligations under the contract
of employment and the fiduciary as opposed to personal powers conferred under
scheme documents. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.2.15. (9) The employer
should be regarded as having a number of unexcludable obligations to the scheme
including proper funding in accordance with scheme documentation and the general law. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.2.17. (10) The primary duties of
the trustees in relation to the pension promise should be given statutory expression. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.2.18.
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assumptions."0 The Committee noted that particular difficulties arose with regard to both defining surpluses and the Inland Revenue requirement that excess surpluses (of over 105
percent) had to be disposed of by employers within five years
in order to protect their tax exempt status. This was achieved
in practice through contribution holidays, withdrawal of funds
by employers, and benefit improvements. The Committee made
separate recommendations with regard to surpluses in on-going schemes"' and on winding-up. 2
3. Funding
The proper funding of a scheme's accrued liabilities was
considered fundamental to the pension promise. Proper funding was a means of protecting accrued rights even in the event
of the insolvency of the sponsoring employer. To do so, howev80 See GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at paras. 1.1.3, 4.3.3.

8 These recommendations were: (11) Substantial changes to the law governing
surpluses were not required, but some additional restrictions should be imposed on
employer payments. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at paras. 4.3.27, 4.3.28. (12)
The Inland Revenue Surplus Regulations should be amended to include insured
schemes. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.3.27. (13) Payments to the employer should generally not be permitted unless authorised by the trust deed or an
amendment pursuant to a modification order by the Pensions Regulator with consent to payments or amendments only being approved by the Regulator in limited
cases. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.3.30. (14) Where the trust deed did
not allow for employer payments, the employer should be required to notify
scheme members to enable them to make representations to the Regulator against
payment being permitted. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.3.30. (15) The
employer should continue to be able to make contribution holidays within the
limits permitted by the scheme rules in balance of cost earnings-related schemes
except where the funding level would fall below the new minimum solvency requirement recommended. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.3.33. (16) The
Inland Revenue 5 year rule for elimination of excess surplus by contribution holiday should be extended to the average length of future service of active members
up to 15 years. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.3.35. (17) The tax charge
on non-eliminated excess surplus only applyink to surpluses in excess of the 105%
limit should be confirmed in statute. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para.
4.3.37).
82 These recommendations were: (18) Surpluses on winding-up should generally
be dealt with in accordance with scheme rules, failing which trustees should be
given statutory discretion as to the application of fimds rather than allow this to
revert to the employer by way of resulting trust or to the Crown as bona vacantia. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.3.48. (19) If the scheme rules prohibit
employer payments, member benefits should be augmented and trustees given
discretion to allocate any further balances as they see fit subject to regulatory
approval. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.3.48.
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er, funding had to be set at a level which ensured that the
scheme was in a position to meet all of its liabilities as they
fell due. In connection with this, the Committee considered
whether a statutory minimum solvency requirement should be
imposed and how it should operate in practice. The Committee
concluded that such requirement was appropriate, subject to
certain exceptions, and made a number of recommendations
with regard to the cover required and its administration and
operation in practice.'

83

These recommendations were:

(20) A minimum solvency requirement was

necessary to secure the pension rights of members. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8,
at para. 4.4.16. (21) Schemes which were unapproved solely because they provided
for benefits in excess of Inland Revenue earnings-related limits or earnings caps
should be exempt from any funding requirement. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at
para. 4.4.19. (22) A solvency band should be set between the minimum solvency
standard of 100% and a base level of 90% with funds falling below the minimum
requiring an injection of funds within three months of receipt of notification from
the actuary of the deficiency, failing which the trustees should be required to recover the necessary funds from the employer. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at
paras. 4.4.20, 4.4.21. (23) Trustees should notify the members in the event of the
employer not injecting funds within 14 days. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at
para. 4.4.22. (24) The regulator should be empowered to take whatever remedial
measures appear necessary in the event of the trustees being unable or unwilling
to recover the necessary funds. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.4.23. (25)
All schemes subject to the minimum solvency requirement would have to establish
and maintain a funding plan in compliance with their 100% level, with the trustees submitting a business plan in the event of contravention providing for restoration within the three years subject to the further intervention of the Regulator.
GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.4.24. (26) The trustees and scheme actuary should be under a duty to report any shortfall to the Regulator as soon as
they become aware of it. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.4.26. (27) Liabilities should be calculated as the sum of cash equivalence calculated on the same
basis as for individual transfer values for active and deferred members and the
cost of immediate annuities for pensioners. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at paras.
4.4.45, 4.4.46. (28) The government should consider introducing a new security to
back schemes' indexed liabilities. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.4.47.
(29) A five year transition period should be introduced for compliance with the
new solvency standard. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.4.48. (30) Merged
schemes should comply with the solvency requirement as soon as possible with
any previously under-funded scheme benefits being postponed in the event of a
winding-up. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.4.50. (31) Methodology should
be continually revised to produce greater consistency in the assessment of scheme
solvency than at present. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.4.53. (32) Trustees should provide an annual certificate of solvency from the scheme actuary in
addition to the full valuation which is carried out every three and a half years.
GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.4.54. (33) Tax relief on any special contributions in relation to solvency shortfalls should be provided immediately. GOODE
REPORT, supra note 8, at paras. 4.4.57, 4.4.58.
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4. Pension Fund Trustees
The Committee noted the importance of trustee fimctions
being properly carried out in connection with the administration of all types of schemes. The Committee, however,
recognised the wide variety and expertise of trustee boards.
They, therefore, attempted to balance the introduction of new
legislative measures with the promotion of higher standards
through statements of good practice and the provision of proper training programmes. Recommendations made to deal with
various trustee concerns included the qualification and disqualification of trustees, the degree of employer control over trustee
appointment and removal as well as the composition of the
trustee board, the distribution of powers between the employer
and trustees, trustees' conflicts of interest, outdated restrictions on the powers of trustees, the inability of trustees to
meet claims against them for loss caused by breach of duty and
the level of knowledge of trustees concerning their role and
responsibility.'

" Other recommendations included: (34) The new authority should have the
power to disqualify persons from acting as trustees where they have been convicted of fraud, theft or other dishonesty subject to a right of appeal. Trustees
should be subject to automatic disqualification on the same grounds as applied to
company directors under the Company Directors Disqualification Act of 1986
(Bankruptcy, etc.). GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at paras. 4.5.13, 4.5.12. (35) The
scheme auditor and actuary should not be allowed to act as trustees and good
practice should also exclude the scheme administrator. GOODE REPORT, supra note
8, at para. 4.5.14. (36) Employers should not have the sole power to appoint trustees and should not be able to veto member selections. GOODE REPORT, supra note
8, at para. 4.5.21. (37) Schemes should not be required to appoint pensioner trustees but should be encouraged to consider including them on the board of trustees.
GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.5.28. (38) Members should be entitled to
appoint, at least, one-third of the trustees subject to a minimum of two in relation
to earnings-related schemes with the employers appointing the balance. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.5.40. (39) Members should be entitled to appoint, at
least, two-thirds of the trustees subject to a minimum of two in relation to money
purchase schemes. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.5.40. (40) The regulators should have power to determine whether hybrid schemes should be subject to
the one-third or two-thirds rule. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.5.41. (41)
With the agreement of the employer, scheme members should be allowed to appoint non-member trustees including trade union representatives with any disagreements being referred to the authority. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para.
4.5.42. (42) Guidance should be provided by the authority with the assistance of
the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service ("ACAS") as to the means of
trustee selection. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.5.43. (43) Existing appointment rules should continue in place until either the employers or members
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5. Amendment and Winding-Up
Particular difficulties may arise with regard to the amendment or winding-up of schemes by employers, balancing the
interests of different categories of members and protecting
accrued rights.' The Committee considered that the existing
rules governing amendment and winding-up were unsatisfactory. It thought that members' interests should best be protected
through trustees who should be required to balance all differing interests in as fair a manner as possible. The favourable or
detrimental impact of amendment or winding-up on future or
accrued rights should be taken into account. Notice should also
be given where accrued rights may be affected, and winding-up
should be subject to the oversight of the Occupational Pensions
Regulatory Authority ("OPRA"). Other problems in this area
dealt with the calculation and security of benefits, delays in
awarding pensions and transfer values and discriminatory
trustee decisions. A number of recommendations were made to
86
attempt to resolve these difficulties.
exercise their rights under the new rules. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para.

4.5.44. (44) No minimum or maximum terms of office for trustees should be set

out in law. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.5.46. (45) Employers should
not be able to remove member-appointed trustees except on a unanimous decision
of all trustees and subject to authority notification. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8,
at para. 4.5.49. (46) Certain matters should always be reserved to the trustees
including the appointment of scheme auditor, actuary, fund manager or other professional adviser, investment strategy, distribution of unallocated surpluses and
treatment of discretionary benefits. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.5.52.
(47) Other matters should be dealt with under the scheme rules including the
closing, freezing or winding-up of the scheme, increasing benefits or reducing or
stopping contributions. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.5.53. (48) Trustee
meetings should be held on a regular basis subject to proper notice, distribution of
agenda and papers and minutes being kept. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para.
4.5.57. (49) Trustee boards should meet,'at least, once a year to approve the annual report and actuarial certificate and on such other occasions as may be reasonable. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.5.57. (50) Trustee boards should
decide matters by a majority subject to unanimity being required under the
scheme rules. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.5.58. (51) Pension funds
should not be required to be bonded or insured against liability. GOODE REPORT,
supra note 8, at para. 4.5.64. (52) Member trustees should be allowed reasonable
time off for training by employers without loss of pay. GOODE REPORT, supra note
8, at para. 4.5.65.
See GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, ch. 4.6.
8 Such recommendations included: (53) The authority should be empowered to
consent to scheme amendments and winding-up on behalf of members and beneficiaries who cannot be traced. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.6.7. (54) It
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6. Early Leaving
Several issues arose in the event of a member's early leaving of a pension scheme. The immediate concern was the preservation of value of the member's accrued pension and whether
deferred members should be placed in the same position as
current members or be made subject to some separate treatment which, at least, maintained the real value of the original
pension. Difficult issues also arose as to whether discretionary
benefits should be included in calculating the amount to be
transferred to other schemes. Moreover, in the event of a
scheme's merger, unresolved questions existed regarding de-

was not necessary to place limits on powers of amendment to schemes which affected members' past or future rights favourably provided that the minimum solvency requirements were complied with. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para.
4.6.12. (55) Amendments should not be permitted where they detrimentally affect
accrued rights subject to approval by the authority in exceptional cases. GOODE
REPORT, supra note 8, at paras. 4.6.13-4.6.15. (56) Employers' right to procure
changes should be subject to scheme rules, employment law and members' contracts of employment. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.6.16. (57) Active
members should be notified of detrimental amendments in advance insofar as practical. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.6.17. (58) Employers should be able
to wind-up schemes with or without consent of scheme members subject to compliance with the minimum solvency requirements and new compensation arrangements. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.6.21. (59) Trustees should give
members reasonable notice where a scheme is to be wound-up not involving the
insolvency of the employer. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.6.23. (60) A
minimum amount of information in a standard format should be provided to members concerning the process of winding-up. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para.
4.6.24. (61) Updated information should also be provided, at least, annually in
relation to the winding-up. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.6.24. (62) The
authority' should be notified of the winding-up of all schemes within 14 days of
commencement and should itself have the power to wind-up schemes in the event
of the employer's insolvency, under-funding or inadequate provision or following
proper investigation. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at paras. 4.6.25, 4.6.26. (63)
The Ombudsman should have the power to pass cases to the authority where
winding-up may be appropriate. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.6.28. (64)
The authority should have the power to appoint a suitable trustee or trustees
irrespective of the type of scheme involved in the event of the employer's insolvency. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.6.30. (65) Benefits should be calculated on the basis of cash equivalence in the event of a winding-up with distribution being effected in accordance with the scheme rules in the event of additional
assets being available. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.6.31. (66) The
scheme rules should govern how benefits are applied on a winding-up. GOODE
REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.6.35. (67) Interim awards should be made by
trustees. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.6.67. (68) The Employer Debt
Regulations should be amended as then currently proposed: GOODE REPORT, supra
note 8, at para. 4.6.42.
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lays by trustees in responding to transfer payment requests,
the quality of advice given to members in relation to transfers
and whether the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations of 1981 should apply to pension rights
in addition to other rights and obligations in the event of a
business being taken over. Early leaving problems may arise
as a result of individual choice, scheme transfer in the event of
a company sale or merger or re-organisation of existing pension arrangements. A number of recommendations were again
made in this regard."
7. Scheme Administration
The Committee noted the importance of the role of administrators and professional advisers such as actuaries, auditors
and lawyers in connection with the operation of pension
" These recommendations were: (69) The Committee decided that deferred
pensions should continue to be revalued by prices capped at 5%. GOODE REPORT,
supra note 8, at paras. 4.7.14, 4.7.17. (70) No change was required to the present
preservation and revaluation requirements for money purchase schemes. GOODE
REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.7.19. (71) The actuarial certificate should provide
adequate protection for scheme members affected by bulk transfers with individual
member consent not being required. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8,at para. 4.7.25.
(72) Bulk transfers between schemes or by single employers on the winding-up of
one scheme should be permitted without the consent of members. GOODE REPORT,
supra note 8, at para. 4.7.26. (73) Transfer values of a fully-funded scheme should
be calculated on a no less favourable basis and reduced proportionately where the
solvency of the scheme was less than 100%. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para.
4.7.29. (74) The range of existing transfer values should be narrowed by the actuarial profession. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.7.31. (75) Employers
should not be allowed to grant non-reduced early retirement to particular groups
of members without this being reflected in the calculation of transfer values by
the actuary. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.7.38. (76) Trustees should
retain the right to decide whether discretionary benefits should be included or
excluded by the actuary on calculation of a transfer value. GOODE REPORT, supra
note 8,at para. 4.7.40. (77) The authority should be able to impose a penalty on
the scheme administrator if, without good cause, the transfer value was not paid
within the 12 month period prescribed by statute. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at
para. 4.7.48. (78) A clear and simple leaflet explaining transfer processes should be
produced by the authority and made available to all scheme members. GOODE
REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.7.49. (79) A statement of guidance concerning the
provision of general advice should be produced by the Securities and Investments
Board ("SIB") in light of the potential implications of the Financial Services Act.
GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.7.52. (80) The existing Transfer of Undertakings provisions should not be extended to pension rights although a test
case should be raised by the government with the European Court of Justice to
confirm the matter. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.7.55.
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schemes. Their specific obligations and responsibilities, however, were not considered to be sufficiently clear. Further confusion arose with regard to the relationship between trustees
and their sponsoring employer. Increased clarity was accordingly recommended. The Committee also noted the importance
of the employer's function in controlling and administering
cash movements in and out of schemes. Difficulties, however,
may arise in this area with regard to the netting off of payments and the security of the funds involved. Thus, the Committee considered the value of using separate trustee bank
accounts for all types of schemes. 8

Specifically, (81) Trustees should ensure that services are clearly defined in
service documents where the administration is conducted by the sponsoring employer. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.8.7. (82) A scheme actuary should
be appointed by the trustees in every scheme. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at
para. 4.8.16. (83) The scheme actuary should be required to certify scheme solvency annually on a minimum solvency basis with the solvency certificate being sent
to the authority. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.8.20. (84) Trustees and
employers should be under statutory duties to provide all information necessary
for the actuary. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.8.22. (85) Actuaries
should be required to report serious or persistent irregularities to the authority
and be exempt from any legal liabilities for doing so. GOODE REPORT, supra note
8, at para. 4.8.23. (86) Scheme auditors should be appointed by the trustees which
may include the employer's auditor, provided that their roles and responsibilities
are clearly set out in the appointment document. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at
paras. 4.8.28, 4.8.30. (87) Auditors should be required to report serious or persistent irregularities to the authority again subject to exemption from legal liability.
GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.8.36. (88) Fund managers should generally be appointed and instructed by trustee boards with their terms of appointment
being set out in a formal letter of engagement. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at
para. 4.8.39. (89) Trustees should always ensure that managers are provided with
a clear statement of their duties and the fund's investment strategy. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.8.40. (90) The role and terms of reference of the
legal adviser should be set out in a formal letter of appointment with any conflicts
of interest being properly notified. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.8.46.
(91) Administrators should be required to file with the authority an audited statement that contributions have been received at due dates and at appropriate rates
and that they have been invested on a timely basis. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8,
at para. 4.8.53. (92) Money purchase scheme payments should be made within a
fixed time limit (less than two months) subject to penalty. GOODE REPORT, supra
note 8, at para. 4.8.57. (93) Earnings-related scheme employee contributions should
be paid within one month of the payroll date as a matter of good practice. GOODE
REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.8.58. (94) Additional voluntary contributions
should be subject to the same rules as money purchase schemes. GOODE REPORT,
supra note 8, at para. 4.8.59. (95) A schedule of due payment dates should be prepared by the employer and trustees. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.8.62.
(96) All special contributions should be noted on the schedule of payments. GOODE
REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.8.63. (97) Scheme members should be notified by
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8. Fund Management
The Committee recognized both the central role of trustees
in the fund management process and the need to clearly define
the rights and obligations of trustees and fund managers concerning the proper investment strategy and practices to be
adopted. The current provisions applicable to the criteria for
prudent investment and powers of delegation were examined.
As it was essential that the assets of a scheme were at all
times able to match liabilities, the investment of the pension
fund was of crucial importance to the security of the pension
9
rights along with the employee and employer contributions.
The Committee also considered the continuing legitimacy of

the trustees of contributions more than three months overdue. GOODE REPORT,
supra note 8, at paras. 4.8.64, 4.8.65. (98) GMP priority should be extended to all
payments due in the event of the employer's insolvency. GOODE REPORT, supra
note 8, at para. 4.8.68. (99) While payment netting may continue, payments not to
be made within a short period should be credited to a separate bank trust account. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at paras. 4.8.71, 4.8.73. (100) All pension
schemes should be required to maintain separate bank trust accounts apart from
wholly-insured schemes where the employer does not handle cash directly. GOODE
REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.8.76. (101) All those involved in the administration of pension schemes should be required to keep proper books and records.
GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.8.77. (102) Trustees should be required to
make an annual return to the authority consisting of a copy of audited scheme
accounts, the administrator's statement of payment of contributions, the actuarial
certificate of scheme solvency and, where appropriate, an actuarial certificate of
the scheme's ability to meet its GMP obligations. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at
para. 4.8.78.
89 Specifically, (103) A new statutory prudent investment standard should be
adopted imposing on trustees a general duty of reasonable care and diligence.
GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.9.7. (104) The Trustee Investments Act
of 1961 and the Money Purchase Contracted-Out Schemes Regulations 1987 rules
should be replaced by flexible investment guidelines in a new Pensions Act. GOODE
REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.9.8. (105) Annual reports should contain a statement by the trustees that they have carefully considered the investments and are
satisfied that they comply with the statutory criteria. GOODE REPORT, supra note
8, at para. 4.9.9. (106) Normal stock lending practices should not be prohibited.
GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.9.16. (107) The present law on ethical
and socially responsible investment was satisfactory. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8,
at para. 4.9.18. (108) The practice revisions adopted by IMRO and the SIB should
be continued. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.9.24. (109) Section 23 of the
Trustee Act of 1925 and of the Trusts (Scotland) Act of 1921 should be extended
to allow decision making powers to be delegated to an authorised fund manager
without vicarious liability. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.9.29.
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stock lending and whether pension schemes should invest in
ethical or socially responsible projects as well as whether external fund managers should be used in all cases.
9.

Safeguarding Assets

The issue of asset security was considered by the Committee as it was concerned about the possibility of fraud, theft and
misappropriation. In addition to imprudent investment, asset
values could be affected through desegregation with the return
of assets to the employer, improper dealings with assets or
their proceeds and inadequate record keeping and documentation. While it was not possible to prevent all losses, various
mechanisms could be developed to limit malpractice or make it
easier to avoid. These included asset segregation, independent
custody, asset designation and regulatory control of fund manager activity."°
10. Protection against Employer Insolvency
The Committee was concerned about safeguarding
members' interests through the protection of accrued rights,
proper funding and deficit requirements"-although benefits
might be reduced, or not paid at all, in the event of an
employer's insolvency. The issue of employer insolvency could
be approached either by making fund claims preferred debts in
a winding-up or by introducing separate compensation ar-

"

The Committee recommended:

(110) The present 5% limit on self-investment

should continue although any other inter-fund and employer dealing should be prohibited. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.10.21. (111) Disinvestment of
excessive employer-related holdings should be carried out over a five year period.
GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.10.22.

(112) Any excessive self-invest-

ment should not be taken into account in determining minimum solvency compliance. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.10.23. (113) Small self-administered
schemes should continue to be exempt from self-investment. GOODE REPORT, supra
note 8, at para. 4.10.24. (114) Trustees should not be required to place pension
fund assets with independent custodians in all cases. GOODE REPORT, supra note
8, at para. 4.10.37. (115) Trustees should periodically review the custody arrangements as a matter of good practice. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para.
4.10.37. (116) A code of practice should be laid down by the authority for pension
fund trustees in relation to fund investment. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at
para. 4.10.59.
"1 See supra notes 78-90 and accompanying text.
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rangements. If a new compensation scheme was set up, however, difficulties would arise with regard to defining qualifying
risks, compensation levels and entitlements. Whether the
funds should be paid to schemes or to members, schemes to be
covered and payment mechanisms to be adopted had also to be
considered. As a result of the difficulties issues which arose, a
92
number of recommendations were made in this regard.

', These recommendations were: (117) If a scheme is in deficit, the employer
should make whatever contribution was necessary to secure the scheme's liabilities.
GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.11.1. (118) A debt due from an insolvent
employer created by a shortfall should not be given priority over debts due to
other creditors. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.11.8. (119) Trustees

should be empowered to apply to the court for variation or repayment orders
where a particular member or group has obtained an unreasonable advantage
within three years of the employer's bankruptcy or liquidation. GOODE REPORT,
supra note 8, at paras. 4.11.10, 4.11.11. (120) A compensation scheme should be
established to protect members against the defaults of those dealing in pension
fund assets. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.11.26. (121) Compensation
should be limited to loss resulting from fraud, theft or other misappropriation.
GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.11.37. (122) Pension fund assets for the
purposes of compensation should include any separately identifiable employee contributions which have been misappropriated by the employer. GOODE REPORT,
supra note 8, at para. 4.11.38. (123) All funded schemes should be included along
with insured schemes subject to setting up a separate streamlined regulatory and
compensation procedure. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at paras. 4.11.39, 4.11.41.
(124) Compensation should be paid as a lump sum based on the lower of lost
assets or scheme deficit taking into account any right of recourse from the employer. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at paras. 4.11.46, 4.11.47. (125) An independent
Pension Compensation Board should be established. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8,
at para. 4.11.50. (126) The Board should have the power to make interim payments or reduce or withhold amounts where the trustees have not taken reasonable steps to recover losses. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.11.51. (127)
If a scheme is in deficit, the authority should be able to apply to the court for an
information order. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.11.52. (128) All compensation payments should be made by way of loan to account for possible recovery. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.11.54. (129) Compensation should
only be limited to the lesser of 90% of the value misappropriated or 90% of the
deficit. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.11.59. (130) The Board should
have power to determine how payments are distributed. GOODE REPORT, supra
note 8, at para. 4.11.61. (131) The cost of the compensation scheme should be
imposed on occupational schemes generally. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para.
4.11.69. (132) The scheme should be funded by means of a post-event levy on all
schemes in proportion to the value of liabilities which have to be funded for the
purpose of the minimum solvency requirements. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at
paras. 4.11.74, 4.11.75. (133) Employers should be required to pay any additional
contribution equal to any payment from the pension scheme to the compensation
scheme in relation to money purchase schemes. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at
para. 4.11.75. (134) The Board should have borrowing powers in anticipation of
levy. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.11.75. (135) Levy provisions should
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11. Information for Scheme Members
Scheme members must be provided with all necessary
information to allow them to understand benefits and developments as well as to confirm the security of any entitlements
and the proper and competent administration of a scheme. A
large amount of information had been provided under the
OPB's 1986 Disclosure Regulations although difficulties continued to arise with regard to the ability of members to understand the material provided. The Committee accordingly considered the most important matters concerning the administration of the scheme which members would require, the interests
of different categories of members and whether information
should be provided on request or automatically. Various recommendations were made.9 3
come into immediate effect subject to transitional provisions in relation to the
minimum solvency standard. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.11.78.
' These recommendations were: (136) Schemes should be encouraged to consolidate their trust deeds and rules, at least, every five years (para 4.12.20). (137)
The current restriction on the availability of scheme documents to one inspection
every 12 months should be removed. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para.
4.12.21. (138) If a charge was levied for the provision of copies, this should be
limited to the cost of photocopying. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.12.22.
(139) Information in an easy to understand format and in plain English should be
provided with regard to whether the scheme is registered and its registration
number, the nature of the pension promise with contributions payable, scheme
benefits and benefit security, past policy with regard to pension increases, trustee
arrangements, the powers of scheme amendment and rights to further information.
GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.12.26. (140) All active members and pensioners should receive an annual statement in plain English showing their individual benefits and key information concerning the scheme including solvency levels,
basic asset distribution and fund movements. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at
para. 4.12.28. (141) Members should be able to obtain additional information on
request including a full annual report and accounts. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8,
at para. 4.12.28. (142) The authority should consider how information should be
made available concerning money purchase schemes (para 4.12.30). (143) A review
of the current provisions governing pension scheme accounts should be undertaken
by the relevant authorities. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.12.33. (144)
The security of schemes would be improved by amending the Disclosure Regulations to include, for example, having the trustee board approve the accounts and
authorise their signature by, at least, two trustees, having the reports and accounts written in English and having them available to members and lodged with
the Pensions Registry with seven months of the end of the scheme year. GOODE
REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.12.33. (145) Trustees should make their actuarial
valuation available to members within a maximum of 21 months of the valuation
date as at present or 3 months of receipt whichever is less. GOODE REPORT, supra
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12. Dispute Resolution
The Committee determined that the present OPAS procedures for settling disputes with regard to pension schemes
were unsatisfactory. Court action was also thought to be difficult and expensive while the Ombudsman's powers were considered to be too restricted. A number of recommendations
were made to attempt to make the system as fair, accessible
and speedy as possible for both individual and collective disputes. 4

note 8, at para. 4.12.34. (146) Deferred members should have the right to receive
an individual statement of rights and benefits and a copy of the annual report
and accounts on request. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.12.40. (147)
Time limits and penalties should be imposed on the supply of information. GOODE
REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.12.45.
" Such recommendations were: (148) All medium and larger schemes should
be required to establish a formal internal disputes procedure in an approved form
of which members must be notified. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para.
4.13.38. (149) There should be sufficient financial support given to OPAS to enable
it to employ paid conciliation staff and to arrange meetings with complainants,
administrators and trustees as necessary. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para.
4.13.39. (150) The jurisdiction of the Ombudsman should be extended to include
disputes between employers and trustees or among trustees rather than be replaced by a tribunal. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at paras. 4.13.42, 4.13.43.
(151) The Ombudsman should be given power to enforce decisions directly. GOODE
REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.13.43. (152) The Ombudsman should be able to
direct that compensation payments include a reasonable sum to reflect distress,
delay and inconvenience as well as actual financial loss. GOODE REPORT, supra
note 8, at para. 4.13.43. (153) The Ombudsman should be encouraged to experiment with informal hearings in an inquisitorial rather than adversarial manner.
GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.13.43. (154) The formal determinations of
the Ombudsman should be published with the names of the parties involved, at
least, where there may be implications for other scheme members or schemes in
general. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.13.43. (155) The office of the
Ombudsman should be given sufficient resources to allow it to discharge its extended responsibilities. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.13.44. (156) The
Ombudsman should be given powers to require papers to be given to OPAS, and
trustees and claimants should be able to ask the Ombudsman to incorporate settlement agreements in a formal determination. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at
para. 4.13.45. (157) The regulatory authority should be empowered to rely on a
determination by the Ombudsman as evidence of facts found by the determination
without the need for further proof. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.13.47.
(158) The manner in which pension fund litigation should be expedited should be
immediately considered with a view toward reducing the costs involved for individual litigants and the use of pre-trial review procedures should, in particular, be
considered with simple and faster procedures being adopted for smaller schemes.
GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at paras. 4.13.51, 4.13.53.
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13. Assignment and Loss of Pension Rights
Although beneficial interests under trusts may be freely
disposed of, many pension fund-related trust deeds contained
prohibitions on dealings in pension entitlements or made them
liable to forfeiture. Accordingly, the Goode Committee made a
number of recommendations with regard to both changes in
the ability of members to deal in their entitlements as well as
with regard to legitimate forfeiture events."5

'" Such recommendations were:
(159) Inalienability of pension rights should be
made a rule of general application. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.14.4.
(160) There is no need for a general change in the law on payment of benefits on
death. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.14.16. (161) Scheme members
should not be entitled to give binding instructions to trustees about the payment
of death benefits unless the scheme rules so provide. GOODE REPORT, supra note
8, at para. 4.14.16. (162) Unnecessary restrictions on trustees' discretion as to
payment of death benefits should be revised, failing which the authority should be
given the power to amend them by way of a modification order. GOODE REPORT,
supra note 8, at para. 4.14.16. (163) Schemes should continue to be allowed to
permit trustees to terminate future payment rights upon bankruptcy and to make
payments to a member's spouse or dependant when the pension was due to come
into payment. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.14.21. (164) Public service
schemes requiring forfeiture where an offence has been committed certified injurious to the state or liable to lead to a serious loss of confidence in the public service should be considered reasonable although they should be subject to a right of
appeal to the courts. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.14.25. (165) Provisions should be made void where pension rights of an ex-employee are forfeited for
any form of misconduct although employers should be allowed to recover any losses suffered through the misconduct. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.14.28.
(166) Conditions as to the exercise of a charge, lien or right of set-off in respect of
short service benefits should be extended to long service benefits with employers
being prohibited from exercising any rights against the benefit due. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.14.32. (167) Immunity from creditors under the
Social Security Pension Act of 1975 to GNPs, and entitlements to protected rights
payments should be extended to cover all pension entitlements. GOODE REPORT,
supra note 8, at para. 4.14.35. (168) Forfeiture should not be allowed by reason of
remarriage or cohabitation with payment of a widows or widowers pension being
protected in law. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.14.38. (169) Trustees
should not be prohibited from refusing a pension to the spouse of a member
where the marriage took place after the related employment although the general
criteria to be applied should be set out in the trust deed and scheme rules as
clearly as possible and made known to members upon joining the scheme and
upon retirement. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.14.40.
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14. Early Pension on Grounds of Ill Health
The Committee considered the circumstances under which
trustees may be allowed to make payments from pension
schemes in respect of ill health or incapacity. A number of
recommendations were made in this regard."
15. Pension Rights on Divorce
The issue of divorcee's rights to pension benefits had been
considered by a number of bodies. An independent Working
Group on Pensions and Divorce had been appointed by the
Pensions Management Institute and had carried out a detailed
study of the rights of divorced spouses to pension benefits."
The Committee recommended that further work be carried out
on the basis of the Working Group's general approach."
16. Public Sector Schemes
The Committee made a number of recommendations concerning the extent to which a public scheme should be treated
differently from a private one."9
Specifically, (170) The rules for entitlement to an ill-health pension should
be left to the determination of individual schemes. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8,
at para. 4.15.12. (171) There was room for improvement in the drafting of scheme
rules and in the procedures for awarding ill-health benefits which could be best
achieved through the adoption of a code of practice. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8,
at para. 4.15.13.

See WORKING GROUP ON PENSIONS AND DIVORCE, PENSIONS AND DIVORCE.
(172) The calculation of transfer values
". These recommendations were:

97

should also take into account the Committee's recommendation with regard to cash
equivalents. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.16.16.
"' These recommendations were: (173) Public sector schemes should be required to comply with the Committee's general recommendations although certain
differences in the structure of private and public sector schemes may require a
distinct approach. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.17.1. (174) Public sector
trust-based schemes should be required to comply with the Committee's recommendations on the composition of trustee boards. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at
para. 4.17.13. (175) Local government legislation should be amended to permit
scheme member involvement in the management of such schemes similar to the
Committee's recommendations concerning private sector earnings-related schemes.
GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.17.13. (176) Public sector schemes should
be required to comply with similar rules concerning the disclosure of information
to members subject to some adjustments, for example, with regard to distinguish-
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17. Inland Revenue and Social Security Requirements
The Committee considered a number of issues with regard
to the impact of complex taxation and Social Security schemes
on the operation of pension schemes and pension payments.
The Committee considered that a number of amendments
should be made.' 0

ing between unfunded and funded schemes. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para.
4.17.14. (177) Legislation governing public service schemes should be consolidated
every five years. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.17.15. (178) All funded
public sector schemes, including local authority schemes, should be required to
comply with the minimum solvency standards proposed. GOODE REPORT, supra
note 8, at para. 4.17.19. (179) The compensation scheme should apply to all funded public sector schemes. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.17.20. (180)
Management committees administering local government schemes should be required to observe the same prudent person standard for investments as private
schemes. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.17.21. (181) Forfeiture provisions
should be narrowly defined and wider provisions in scheme rules made void.
GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para 4.17.22. (182) The Pensions Ombudsman
should have jurisdiction over complaints of maladministration and disputes on
issues of law and fact in public service schemes, including Her Majesty's Forces'
schemes subject to members having exhausted relevant internal complaints procedures. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.17.25. (183) The treatment of future privatisations should consider the security of pension entitlements and the
application of surplus funds of members. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para.
4.17.27.
"®These amendments were: (184) Regulations to allow the surplus of AVCs to
be introduced to ameliorate the difficulties in determining whether payments
would be appropriate. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.18.13. (185) The
Pension Schemes Office should have additional resources to ensure that the existing backlog in the approval of schemes is removed more quickly than proposed
and that targets for the approval of definitive trustees should be achieved in the
future. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.18.22. (186) Whether an earnings
cap should be introduced should be left for political determination. GOODE REPORT,
supra note 8, at para. 4.18.25. (187) The tax regime applicable to occupational
pension schemes should, for practical purposes, continue to be based predominantly
on benefit limits. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.18.40. (188) All scheme
members not affected by the earnings cap should be immediately brought into the
1989 tax regime. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.18.57. (189) The Contracted Out Employment Group of the Department of Social Security should attempt to reduce delay and simplify reporting arrangements with major pension
providers and administrators. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.18.66. (190)
The link between the surplus for the indexation of past accruals should be broken
except where the employer is seeking payment from surplus. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.18.69. (191) No specific recommendations could be made
with regard to the indexation of pension payments in light of the divergent views
which the Committee members held. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para.
4.18.72. (192) Disparities in Social Security and Inland Revenue requirements
should be resolved as soon as possible. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para.
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18. The Structure of Regulation
In addition to making recommendations with regard to the
operation of occupational pension schemes, the Committee
considered it necessary to establish a new regulatory authority.
The new structure was considered necessary to ensure the
protection of the security of members' assets and rights. The
new authority would also consider complaints about the management or suspected misappropriation of assets either by
scheme members or professionals involved in the administration of scheme assets. A number of recommendations were
made with regard to the establishment, operation and funding
of the new authority.'"'
4.18.77.
...These recommendations were: (193) The Pensions Act should lay down a
new statutory framework for occupational pension schemes. GOODE REPORT, supra
note 8, at para. 4.19.2. (194) The Act should have the primary purpose of laying
down principles and rules governing such schemes. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8,
at para. 4.19.3. (195) The new authority or Secretary of State should be empowered to establish streamlined regulatory and compensation procedures for small
schemes administered by insurance companies or other regulated service providers.
GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.19.8. (196) Schemes not required to meet
the minimum solvency requirement should be exempt from other funding rules
although all other provisions should apply in the normal way. GOODE REPORT,
supra note 8, at para. 4.19.9. (197) Members should be clearly advised of the
absence of the pension promise in unfunded schemes and reduced security in funded schemes not required to comply with the minimum solvency requirement.
GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.19.9. (198) Statutory provisions should
clearly indicate the extent to which they amend or overrule the common law or
otherwise provide a defence for breach of a common law duty. GOODE REPORT,
supra note 8, at para. 4.19.12. (199) Mandatory rules should apply automatically
without the need for incorporation in scheme documents (para 4.19.14). (200) Every breach of duty should have a sanction. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para.
4.19.16. (201) Certain breaches of statutory duty should be treated as criminal
offences and made punishable accordingly. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para.
4.19.17. (202) Certain other types of infringement should be treated as civil
wrongs subject to civil proceedings with others being only sanction by the authority. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.19.18. (203) The Pensions Act should
be supplemented by other statutory and non-statutory measures including appropriate codes of practise. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.19.19. (204) The
codes of practise should, in particular, provide a useful supplement to regulation
in such matters as disclosure, prior notification, transfer procedures, board composition and frequency and conduct of trustee meetings. GOODE REPORT, supra note
8, at paras. 4.19.20, 4.19.21. (205) The regulatory authority should have wide-ranging functions and powers. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.19.22. (206)
The authority should be given the power and resources to carry out spot checks as
well as detailed investigations independently of any complaint. GOODE REPORT,
supra note 8, at para. 4.19.24. (207) The authority should be required to ensure
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19. European Policy on Cross-Border Pension Provision
The Committee noted the work which had been carried out
by the European Commission to facilitate cross-border occupational pension schemes. Although difficulties remained to be
resolved, the Committee considered that its proposals were
02
fully consistent with the European policy adopted."
The U.K. government strongly welcomed the recommendations contained in the Goode Report.0 3 It was, in particular,
supportive of the aims of modernising and improving the
framework of law effecting occupational pension funds in order
to bring about a fair balance between the interests of scheme
members, pensioners and employers. Moreover, the government agreed that trust, rather than corporate, law remained
the best available framework for such schemes.
Before implementing the 218 recommendations contained
in the Report, the government sought industry and professional opinion on the detailed issues raised. It was particularly

that security was not put at risk and that management systems were sound although it should not be prescribed how they should be achieved through detailed
regulations. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.19.25. (208) The authority
should be directed by a person who has a detailed understanding of the pension
industry and authority to enforce statutory requirements and develop voluntary
standards. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.19.28. (209) The new authority
should replace the OPB. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.19.30. (210) An
advisory committee should be set up to support the authority which should, in
particular, consult with the pensions industry and report to the Secretary of State.
GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.19.31. (211) The advisory committee
should represent a wide range of interests including scheme members and pension
providers. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.19.31. (212) The costs of the
authority should be met by the state rather than the industry. GOODE REPORT,
supra note 8, at para. 4.19.33. (213) The authority should be required to make an
annual report to the Secretary of State a copy of which should be laid before
Parliament and published. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.19.34. (214)
The authority should have a wide range of penalties including reprimand, severe
reprimand and fine, removal or disqualification of trustees and the winding-up of
schemes. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.19.35. (215) The authority
should be immune from liability for all bona fide regulatory acts. GOODE REPORT,
supra note 8, at para. 4.19.37. (216) Information should be exchanged between the
regulatory authority and other regulators insofar as relevant to the exercise of its
powers and functions. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.19.39. (217) Responsibility for the conduct of investment business should remain with the fimancial services authorities. GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.19.52.
'02 See GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at para. 4.20.16.
103 See 258 HC OFFICIAL REPORT col. 527 (6 Series, 24 Apr. 1995).
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anxious to receive comments with regard to the operation of
the Committee's recommendations concerning the minimum
solvency requirement, surpluses, management of schemes,
compensation and regulation prior to drafting any new legislation.
V. THE PENSIONS ACT OF 1995
The currently-effective Pensions Act of 1995 implemented
many of the recommendations contained in the Goode Report
4
The objecwith regard to occupational pension schemes."
tive of the Act was to increase confidence in the security of
occupational pensions and to enhance choice by making moneypurchase provision attractive to a wider age range of people. A
state pension age of 65 was also introduced, and the Act made
it easier for occupational schemes to provide equal treatment
for men and women.0 5 OPRA was established with new powers of investigation and enforcement and a separate compensation scheme created to protect members against asset withdrawal. Pensions were also protected against inflation by the
requirement that schemes increase pension rights each year
0 6
by, at least, the retail price index up to 5 percent.
While much of the new law in this area was set forth in
the Act, a large number of specific requirements were subsequently developed through secondary legislation. In addition
to these regulations, the law in this area continues to develop
through statements of practice issued by the OPRA, court
decisions in such areas as trustees, equal treatment, personal
injury and death as well as statutory changes in such other
law, insolvency, income and corporation tax
areas as securities
10 7
and VAT.
Pensions Act of 1995 received its Royal Assent on 19 July 1995. While
certain provisions came into effect on that date, others came into force on October
2 and 4 December 1995 and 1 January 1996. See SI 1995/2548, 3140. The remaining provisions have come into effect on various appointed days.
1"5 See DSS Press Release 94/209, 16 December 1994. A volume of memoranda
relating to the pensions bill was also produced by the House of Commons Social
Security Committee. See HC 336, Session 94-95 (24 April 1994). For comment,
see ELLISON, supra note 8, at para. 1.056B.
106 See ELLISON, supra note 8.
7 For a view of recent developments see, for example, ELLISON, supra note 8,
at Bulletin; CAMERON McKENNA, PENSION LAW BULLETIN; FT Pensions Law and
104 The
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The main improvements in the law of pensions introduced
under the Act include the following:
1.

The Occupational Pensions Regulatory Authority

The establishment and constitution of a new pensions
regulatory authority coinciding with OPRA is provided for
under section 1 and schedule I of the Act.'0 8 The new authority replaces the work of the earlier OPB.0 9 The authority is
required to report to the Secretary of State annually."0
2. Supervision by the OPRA
OPRA is given a broad range of powers to allow it to effect
its supervision of relevant schemes."' These generally follow
the recommendations contained in the Goode Report. Under
the Act, the decisions of OPRA are final subject to an application for review and appeal to the courts on a question of
2
law."

Practice Bulletin.
" The Authority consists of not less than seven members appointed by the
Secretary of State including persons capable of representing a wide range of interests in the pensions area. See SI 1995/2548, 3140, at § 1(2)(3). Members and employees are exempt from liability in the discharge of the functions under the Act.
See id. § 1(4); see also supra note 101.
109See GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at ch. 4.19, recommendation (209); see also
supra note 101.
110See SI 1995/2548, 3140, § 2.
..The Act contains specific provision with regard to prohibition orders (Section
3), suspension orders (Section 4), removal of trustees and notices (Section 5), removal or suspension of trustees (Section 6), appointment of trustees (Sections 7
and 8), removal and appointment of trustees (Section 9), civil penalties (Section
10), powers to wind up schemes (Section 11), injunctions and interdicts (Section
13), restitution (Section 14), and directions (Section 15). See SI 1995/2548, 3140, §§
3-11, 13-15. The Act also contains supplementary provisions concerning disqualification of persons from being trustees (Section 29(3) and (4)), payment of surplus to
employer (Section 37(5)), new 'blowing the whistle' rules (Section 48), grounds for
applying for a modification (Sections 69 and 70), excess assets on winding-up (Section 76) and dissolution of the OPB (Section 150). See id. §§ 29(3)-(4), 37(5), 48,
69, 70, 76, 150; see also GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at ch. 4.19, recommendation (193)-(217); supra note 101.
12

See SI 1995/2548, 3140,

§§

96-97.
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3. Trustees, Directors and Managers
The Act requires trustees to make arrangements for selecting member-nominated trustees and directors up to, at least,
directors." 3 Inone-third of the total number of trustees and
dependent trustees must also be appointed in certain circumstances including the insolvency 4of a company or individual
employer in relation to a scheme."
General provisions are also included with regard to trustof trustees. 5 Specifically, the functions, 6 powers and duties
are inprovisions
ees are set out in some detail." Further . 7
obligathe
cluded with regard to employee trustees" and
tions of trustees and managers in relation to money purchase
schemes." 8
These provisions provided important new guidance with
in
regard to the activities of trustees, directors and managers
relation to relevant pension schemes.

specific provisions being
This provision is subject to certain exceptions with
appointmember-nominated
of
eligibility
and
included dealing with the selection
REPORT, supra note 8, at
GOODE
also
see
16-21;
§§
3140,
1995/2548,
SI
See
ments.
84.
ch. 4.5, recommendations (39)-(40); see also supra note
.. See SI 1995/2548, 3140, §§ 22-26.
trustee, actuary or audi...These include prohibitions on a person acting as a
disqualified from
persons
of
classes
tor of the same scheme, the identification of
not used to reare
scheme
a
of
assets
the
that
ensuring
being trustees and
to pay. See
required
be
may
they
emburse a trustee for any fine or penalty which
88.
84,
note
supra
also
see
27-31;
§§
SI 1995/2548, 3140,
trustee decisions by a major,' The Act includes specific provisions concerning
of investment and delegapower
33),
(Section
powers
ity (Section 32), investment
investments (Section
choosing
35),
tion (Section 34), investment principles (Section
winding-up (Secdefer
to
power
37),
(Section
employer
to
36), payment of surplus
SI 1995/2548,
See
39).
tion 38) and exercise of powers by member trustees (Section
to restrictions on
relating
included
also
are
provisions
Additional
3140, §§ 32-39.
of documents from mememployer-related investments (Section 40) and provisions
40-41.
§§
i.
See
41).
bers (Section
who are trustees to take reasonable time
11' Employers must allow employees
time with the employee being protected
such
of
respect
in
payment
off, provide
of the performance of their
from unfair dismissal or other detriment by reason
see also GOODE REPORT,
42-46;
§§
3140,
1995/2548,
SI
See
trustees.
as
functions
84.
note
supra
(52);
supra note 8, at ch. 4.5, recommendation
"a See SI 1995/2548, 3140, §§ 87-89.
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4. Advisors
Trustees must appoint an auditor and actuary; appointees
must receive instructions from these individuals and report to
the trustees rather than the employer. The Act also requires
them to report any breaches of statutory obligation to
OPRA." 9
5. Receipts, Payments and Records
Particular duties are imposed on trustees with regard to
receipts, payments and records. Trustees must keep all monies
received by them in separate bank accounts except in certain
circumstances. Regulations have also been issued concerning
the recordkeeping of both trustee meetings and all prescribed
transactions. 2
6. Resolution of Disputes
Trustees or managers must implement arrangements for
the resolution of disputes between prescribed persons relative
to all matters concerning a given pension scheme. These must,
in particular, provide for an individual to give a decision on a
disagreement upon application of a complainant. They must
also require the trustees and managers to reconsider the matter following such determination. The particular rules to be
applied are developed in regulations.12 '
7. Indexation
Pensions under approved occupational pension schemes,
excluding public service, must be increased annually by a minimum specified percentage. The rules do not apply to public

...See id. §§ 47-48; see also GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at
ch. 4.8, recommendation (85), (87); supra note 88.
120 See id. § 49; see, e.g., THE OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS
SCHEMES (SCHEME ADMINISTRATION) REGULATIONS, SI 1996/1715.
121 See SI 1995/2548, 3140, § 50; THE
OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS SCHEMES (INTERNAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES) REGULATIONS, SI
1996/1270; GOODE
REPORT, supra note 8, at ch. 4.13, recommendations (148)-(158);
supra note 94.
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service schemes and restrictions are included on increases
where the member is under 55 years of age.'22
8. Minimum Funding Requirement
A minimum funding requirement is established under
which the value of a scheme's assets must not exceed its liabilities."23 Trustees are required to obtain actuarial valuations
and certificates as to the adequacy of contributions in relation
to the overall level of funding and to keep an appropriate
schedule of contributions confirming compliance. OPRA must
be notified where the contributions have not been made in
accordance with the schedule and a report prepared if the
scheme fails to meet the minimum funding requirement. If the
valuation discloses that the assets are less than 90 percent of
the liabilities, the employer must ensure that they are increased to a minimum of 90 percent within a prescribed period.
These provisions introduce important new protections for
member's interests against fraud and misuse.
9. Equal Treatment
Any occupational pensions scheme which does not contain
an equal treatment rule shall be treated as including one for
the purposes of the Act. 24 An equal treatment rule is one
which relates to the terms on which persons become members
and members of the scheme are treated. Under the Act, women
must not be treated any less favourably than men, failing
which the relevant term will be automatically adjusted."
Such provisions were introduced following the decisions of the

12

See SI 1995/2548, 3140, §§ 51-55. The relevant percentage is the percentage

increase in the retail price index for the reference period, being a period determined, in relation to each periodic increase under the rules to be issued or the
percentage for that period which corresponds to 5% per annum, whichever is the
lesser. See id. § 51(4); THE OCCUPATIONAL PENSION SCHEMES (INDEXATION) REGULATIONS 1996, SI 1996/1679.
1' See SI 1995/2548, 3140, §§ 56-61; THE OCCUPATIONAL PENSION SCHEME (MINIMUM FUNDING REQUIREMENT AND ACTUARIAL VALUATIONS) REGULATIONS 1996, SI
1996/1536; GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at ch. 4.4, recommendations (20)-(33);
supra note 83.
124 See SI 1995/2548, 3140, § 62(1).
12 See id. § 62(2)(3).
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European Court of Justice Barber v. Guardian Royal Exchange.12 An exception is included where the terms are attributable to differences between men and women in state pensions under the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act
of 1992 or where they result from the application of actuarial
factors which differ between men and women."

10. Modification of Schemes
The Act introduces new provisions with regard to the modification of schemes. 2 ' Rights to modify schemes must not be
exercised where they would effect any already accrued right or
129
entitlement unless specific conditions are complied with.
Trustees may by resolution modify schemes with a view toward
extending the class of relevant beneficiaries, to comply with
the terms and directions imposed by the Compensation Board
or to otherwise give effect to the terms of Act. OPRA may also
authorise the modification or itself alter a scheme in certain
circumstances. 3 '
11. Winding-Up
New provisions are introduced concerning the priority of
claims under a winding-up. 3 ' The assets of a scheme must be
first applied towards satisfying pension liabilities. If the assets
are insufficient, payments must be made on a proportional

126 Case 262/88, Barber v. Guardian Royal Exch., [1981] QB 344; [19901 2 All
ER 660; see GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at paras. 3.2.40-3.2.45; supra Section
IV(19). The court held that pensions payable under contracted-out occupational
pension schemes were paid for the purposes of Article 119 of the European Community ("EC") Treaty and that benefits under the scheme, including date of commencement, must be equal as between men and women. In light of the significance of the decision, it was held that no claims could be made before the date of
judgement of 19 May 1990 except where claims had already been instituted. This
was confirmed in the second Protocol to the Treaty of the European Union.
See SI 1995/2548, 3140, § 64.
'2
128 See id. §§ 67-72; see also GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at ch. 4.6, recom-

mendations (53)-(57); supra note 86.
i See SI 1995/2548, 3140, § 67(2), (3).
130 See id. § 69(1), (2).
§§ 73-77; GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at ch. 4.6, recommendations
131 See id.
(58)-(67); supra note 86.
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basis, and the difference will be treated as a debt due from the
employer to the trustees or managers of the scheme." 2
12. Pensions Compensation Board
The Pensions Compensation Board is set up under the Act.
The Board consists of a Chairman and two members appointed
by the Secretary of State. 3 ' The Act contains a number of
detailed provisions concerning the functions and powers of the
Board." These functions include specific provision with regard to applications for payment, determination of amounts,
time limits, payments and payment in anticipation. Further,
surplus funds may be distributed amongst schemes upon direction of the Secretary of State.
13. Assignment, Forfeiture and Bankruptcy
Accrued rights or entitlements under occupational pension
schemes are inalienable except as permitted under the Act." 5
Exceptions include assignments in favour of widows, widowers
or dependants."' Forfeiture of rights is also prohibited except
as provided for under the Act." 7

' See SI 1995/2548, 3140, §§ 73(2), 75(1). If an exempt approved scheme under
the Income and Corporation Taxes Act of 1988, id. § 592(1), is wound up, the
power to distribute surplus assets to the employer can only be exercised with the
consent of the trustees in certain circumstances. If assets remain undistributed,
they may either be applied by the trustees to provide additional benefits or be
distributed to the employer. See id. §§ 76, 77.
" See id. § 78(1), (2), sched. 2; GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at ch. 4.11, recommendations (120)-(135); supra note 92.
" See, for example, reports to the Secretary of State (Section 79), review of
decisions (Section 80), cases where compensation provisions apply (Section 81),
applications for payments (Section 82), amount of compensation (Section 83), payments in anticipation (Section 84) and surplus funds (Section 85). See SI
1995/2548, 3140, §§ 79-85. The Act also contains provisions concerning the publication of reports (Section 113) and disclosure of information (Section 114). Id. §§
113, 114.
1
See id. § 91; GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at ch. 4.14, recommendations
(159)-(169); supra note 95.
...See id. § 91(5).
' See id. §§ 92(1), 92-95.
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14. Information
The Act contains new rules concerning the gathering and
disclosure of information by OPRA and the Compensation
Board. OPRA is empowered to require trustees, managers,
professional advisors, employers or any person holding relevant information to disclose such information when it is essential to the carrying on of OPRA's functions. Inspectors may
also be appointed and warrants for entry obtained.13 OPRA
is prohibited, however, from disclosing information except as
provided for under the Act.'39 Disclosure is generally permitted to corresponding overseas authorities, if necessary to discharge the functions of OPRA, or other supervisory agencies or
the Inland Revenue. The Compensation Board may also obtain
necessary information subject to penalty. " °
15. State Schemes
The Act provides for the equalisation of the pensionable
age of women and men at 65, progressively, over a ten year
period beginning on 6 April 2010."41 Amendments are also
introduced to ensure equalisation in terms of entitlement to
state pensions and benefits.
16. Certification
New requirements are introduced under the Act for contracting out of SERPS. These include reductions in contributions to the state scheme, reductions in state scheme benefits
and payments of rebates.'4 2

138 See id. §§ 98-103; GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at ch. 4.12, recommenda-

tions (136)-(147); supra note 93.
...See SI 1995/2548, 3140, §§ 104(1), 105-09.
1" See id. §§ 110-14.
.. See id. at pt. II, § 216. See generally GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at ch.
4.17, recommendations (173)-(183); supra note 99.
at pt. III, §§ 135-51.
142 See id.
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17. Ancillary Measures
A number of more general provisions are included in Part
V of the Act. 4 3 The most important of these relate to the extension of the jurisdiction and resources of the Pensions Ombudsman, provision for an annual increase in the rate of personal pensions and the strengthening of the duty of the courts
to regard the value of pensions in considering divorce settlements.'" A levy on pension schemes is also included to provide for the costs of OPRA and the Compensation Board.
Based on the above provisions and the relevant secondary
legislation subsequently enacted, a significant new regulatory
framework has been created for both occupational and personal
pension schemes within which the rights and interests of members are now subject to much more complete and effective
protection. Many of the core provisions given effect under the
Act are based on the earlier recommendations contained in the
Goode Report. Thus, the effect has been to create a solid body
of statutory and secondary provision for the control of both
scheme structures and operation in addition to the protections
already provided for under the common law.
Unfortunately, one continuing difficulty which arises is
that the law in this area has become correspondingly more
complex as supplementary levels of protection have been provided. This makes pensions law increasingly less accessible to
the general public as well as to all but the most expert of professional advisers and, consequently, expensive to confirm and
enforce. Substantial new burdens have also been placed on
scheme trustees and managers and, to a lesser extent, employers while the new regulatory authorities including OPRA, the
Compensation Board and the Pensions Ombudsman have had
to adjust to new requirements imposed.

These provisions include transfer values (Sections 152-154), penalties (Section
155), the Pensions Ombudsman (Sections 157-159), modification and winding-up of
schemes (Section 161), personal pensions (Sections 162-164), levy (Section 165),
pensions and divorce (Section 166), war pensions (Section 168), official and public
service pensions (Sections 170-172) and consequential amendments (Sections 173175 and 176-181). See SI 1995/2548, 3140, §§ 152-55, 157-59, 161-66, 168, 170-81.
1. See supra Section IV(15); supra note 98.
143
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Finally, these above provisions only relate to scheme supervision and control rather than benefit or payment rules.
Much of the more recent attention in this area has accordingly
focused on larger systems of reform with a view toward creating more effective and fairer savings, funding and payment
structures.
VI. UNITED KINGDOM PENSION REFORM
The operation of pension schemes and pension provision
has received an increasing amount of political and economic
attention in the United Kingdom especially since the late
1970s. Particular concerns have, for example, arisen with regard to the economic impact of current pension arrangements
and the size of the funds involved. Specific criticisms have, in
particular, been directed at the distorting effect of large pension funds on the normal savings processes within the economy 145 as well as with regard to the concentration of power in
pension146fund managers and associated dissolution of member
rights.
Although some consensus appears to have developed with
regard to the need for a revised system of pension provision in
the United Kingdom, the various specific differences of opinion
which have arisen have made it increasingly difficult to arrive
at any clear and generally acceptable solution. 47
The response adopted to date by the various political parties and other interested welfare and research bodies or institutions has been varied. 48 Despite its earlier radical propos-

145 See,

e.g., VICTOR MORGAN, CHOICE IN PENSIONS; THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF

SAVING FOR RETIREMENT (1984); DAVID FANNING, PENSION FUNDS IN THE UNITED
KINGDOM FINANCIAL MARKETS (Societe Universitaire de Researches Financieres,

SUERF Series N 037 A, 1985); CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES, PERSONAL AND PORTABLE PENSIONS FOR ALL (1983); B. Dumbleton & J. Shutt, Pensions: The Capitalist Trap, NEW STATESMAN, 7 Sept. 1979, at 334-37; Tony Jackson, Breaking Up
The Pension Funds, INVESTORS CHRONICLE, 29 Apr. 1983; see also ROBERT L.
CLARKE, THE ECONOMICS OF INDIVIDUAL AND POPULATION AGEING (1980); RETIREMENT POLICY: THE NEXT FIFTY YEARS (Fogarty ed., 1982).
146 See, e.g., BRYN DAVIES, LOCKING THE STABLE DOOR: THE OWNERSHIP AND
CONTROL OF OCCUPATIONAL PENSION FUNDS (1992).
147 See, e.g., supra Sections II, III, IV. For comment, see ELLISON, supra note 8,
at paras. 1.051-.056B.
14 The Labour party announced in its 1992 manifesto that it would restore the
link between increases in the basic pension and prices or earnings as well as
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als, the new Labour government has most recently produced a
more modest and arguably realistic set of proposals in relation
to U.K. pension reform. Although much of the detail remains
to be confirmed, a number of important new initiatives have
been announced.

VII. THE FUTURE OF PENSIONS PROVISIONS IN THE UNITED
KINGDOM
The government published its Green Paper on a Partnership in Pensions in December 1998.149 As part of an overall
review of pensions provision following its election in May 1996,
the new government set up an independent Pensions Provision
Group. The object of the Group was to consider the current

extend the national insurance system to low-paid and part-time workers. Rather
than have a fixed retirement age, a flexible period of retirement between the ages
of 60 and 70. A new National Pensions Plan was also recommended to supplement existing SERPS and to provide people with a pension based on their 20 best
years of earnings. This would also be available to the self-employed. Before opting out, occupational and personal pensions schemes would have to guarantee a
minimum pension as well as equal treatment for men and women. The law would
provide that pension funds belong to their members and not employers with higher employee representatives and an independent trustee chairman. It was subsequently announced in 1995 that the Labour party was considering the integration
of tax and benefits to pensioners to guarantee a minimum income for all. These
ideas have been developed subsequently. See, e.g., BRYN DAVIES, BETTER PENSIONS
FOR ALL (1995).

Frank Field, the Chairman of the Select Committee on Social Security, has
published separate proposals to create a new mixed state and private pension
framework based on compulsory employee and employer contributions. All employers would be required to pay a contribution equal to 6% of gross salary into a
private pension, employees would pay a contribution of 4% of gross salary with
the state making up contributions for those not in employment. A guaranteed
minimum pension of a value, at least, 20% above the current state provision
would be introduced with a levy being imposed on those who receive more than
£9,000 per annum from their private pension scheme. Pension fund members
would also have the right to transfer the funds to other recognised financial institutions including trade unions and friendly societies. See, e.g, FRANK FIELD &
MATHEW OWEN, PRIVATE PENSIONS FOR ALL: SQUARING THE CIRCLE.

Other reform proposals include the formulation of a national retirement policy,
a reduction in the power of pension funds, equalising the tax treatment of pension
schemes and the creation of a Unified Funded Pension Scheme fo Britain. For
general discussion see, for example, DAVID BLAKE, ISSUES IN PENSION FUNDING ch.
8 (1992); BLAKE, supra note 21, at ch. 16; ELLISON, supra note 8, at para. 1.056;
RICHARD NOBLES, PENSIONS, EMPLOYMENT AND THE LAW ch. 10 (1993); Blake &
Orzsag, supra note 4, at ch. 6.
149 See GREEN PAPER, supra note 8.
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state of pension provision in the United Kingdom and to outline possible likely future trends.15 ° The Pension Provision
Group Report, therefore, contained a detailed analysis of the
issues which had to be addressed in considering pension reform. This formed the basis of the later Green Paper.'5 '
The currently effective Green Paper outlines the effects of
current pension policies in the United Kingdom. It describes
the current system and explains why it cannot meet the demands of the next century without reform.'5 2 It further describes why, in particular, it cannot provide adequate security
for people who cannot afford to save and have lost the trust of
those who can. A "New Insurance Contract" must accordingly
be established which has the aim of restoring trust, encouraging saving and directing assistance where it is most
needed." 3
150 See PENSION PROVISION

GROUP, We All Need Pensions: The Prospects for

Pension Provision (June 1998).
151See GREEN REPORT, supra note 8, at ch. 2, para. 2.
112 See GREEN PAPER, supra note 8, at chs. 1-3.
.. The objectives of the government are to provide security for those who cannot provide for themselves as well as to make it easier for people to save who can
do so. The current system failed those who could not save in that they were not
entitled to basic state pension or SERPS where they did not pay National Insurance contributions earning less than £3,300. Privately-funded schemes were inappropriate for those earning between £3,300 and £9,000 a year due to the small
amount of benefit received as against the high costs and charges involved. Carers
and disabled people, in particular, were also dependent upon the state due to
their inability to make proper pension provision.
The system was also considered to have failed those who could save. Although
occupational pension schemes remained an important source of pension provision,
growth in the use of such schemes had peaked. There had been a decline in the
number of people employed in large companies and in the public sector which had
a strong tradition of occupational pension provision. There had been changes in
the regulation of occupation schemes including the removal of employers entitlement to make membership a condition of employment since 1988. There had also
been a restructuring of occupational pension schemes involving a switch from salary-related to money purchase schemes which had been accompanied by a reduction
in the contribution made by employers to such schemes.
A number of significant changes in the labour market and society had also
taken place which meant that such schemes covered a smaller percentage of the
working population. Fewer people worked for a single employer throughout their
employment lifetime; more were self-employed or only worked on a part-time or
short-term basis. There was continuing growth in employment in small and medium sized companies which were traditionally less likely to provide occupational
pension schemes. More women were also involved in the workplace which created
a greater independence for both men and women although certain deficiencies
persisted, for example, with regard to the rights of women upon divorce.
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In considering the possible options for change available,
the government rejected, at one extreme, the full privatisation
of pension provision and, at the other, the construction of a
state-based provider of pensions built on the continental model.1" 4 The government accordingly decided to retain the basic
structure of the current public and private sector tiered approach but to make a number of changes to this framework
with a view toward securing its more effective operation.
The principal features of the new approach are as follows:155
(1) A new public-private partnership building on the best
features of state and private provisions.
(2) The basic state pension will remain a key building
block of the pension system and will continue to be increased,
at least, in line with prices.
(3) All pensioners will be guaranteed a decent income on
retirement through a minimum income guarantee.
(4) SERPS will be replaced by a new state Second Pension which will ensure that.everyone with either a lifetime of
work or credits from caring will build up rights to a pension
which lifts them above the minimum income guaranteed in
retirement.
(5) The minimum income guarantee and the state Second
Pension will provide security for those who cannot save enough
themselves to produce a decent income in retirement.
(6) A new framework for flexible, secure and value-formoney stakeholder pensions will be created to meet the demands of changes in the labour market and society.
(7) Increased National Insurance rebates will be made
available for people who contract out of SERPS into a stakeholder pension. This will create an additional incentive for
moderate earners to join.

Those who could save were also discouraged from doing so due to shortcomings in the personal pension market including, for example, the high charges involved and recent incidences of mis-selling. Poor information and lack of trust in
the pension system also substantially contributed to creating important
disincentives for people not to save. See GREEN PAPER, supra note 8, at ch. 3.
154See GREEN PAPER, supra note 8, at ch. 6.
'5 See GREEN PAPER, supra note 8, at ch. 6, para. 12.
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(8) Improved pensions education and awareness will be
provided, including the provision of an annual pension statement for every adult.
While the existing basic framework of pension provision
will be retained, efforts will focus on increasing the basic entitlement for the poorest members of society, supplementing this
with a revised state Second Pension in place of SERPS and
introducing the new stakeholder pension scheme to encourage
those with minimum and higher incomes to make increased
provision either as an alternative to, or in addition to, privately-funded arrangements.
A. Basic Pension Provision
The U.K. government is particularly concerned with ensuring that as much assistance as possible is made available to
the poorest pensioners in society. It is recognised that the
present system suffers from a number of important defects and
that pensioner poverty remains a significant problem. Many
pensioners have been unable to build up any form of second
pension to support the minimum state provision while others
have found that it has become increasingly difficult to rely on
state provision alone. For many of these pensioners, it is necessary to rely on income-related benefits and, in particular, income support. Many entitled to claim income support, however,
are not claiming it while the operating rules penalise those
who have built up some savings during their working lives." 6
In response to these difficulties, the government proposes
to immediately introduce a minimum income guarantee,1 57
provide extra help with fuel bills during the winter months 5 8

Since 1988, the income support rules ignore savings below £3,000 while
benefits are reduced on a sliding scale in respect of savings between £3,000 and
£8,000 with no claim being possible for those with savings over £8,000. The effect
of these rules is considered to penalise those who have made some attempt at
saving or who have some savings left. They are accordingly widely resented.
...Beginning in April 1999, the government will introduce a minimum income
guarantee through Income Support of, at least, £75 for single pensions and
£116.60 a week for couples which represents almost three times the increase they
would otherwise have received under the usual income support uprating rules. See
GREEN PAPER, supra note 8, at chs. 5, 6.
158 All eligible pensioner households will be guaranteed a £20 winter fuel payment from 1999/2000 which will benefit almost 10 million pensioners. See GREEN
15
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and adopt measures to increase take-up of the minimum income guarantee provided.'5 9 In the longer-term, the government will attempt to continue to modernise and improve the
ways in which support is delivered to the poorest pensioners
and to attempt to provide greater rewards for those who have
made some provision for their own retirement. The government is also concerned with removing the perceived unfair
operation of the income support qualification rules although no
specific proposals are included in this regard in the Green
Paper. The government only invites comment at this stage.
B.

State Second Pensions

While the government recognises that SERPS has been
successful to a certain extent, it has decided to replace it with
a new state Second Pension which will increase the
entitlements of those on low incomes and carers which have
otherwise been penalised under the earlier system. 6 ' It is
also hoped that the number of people who have had to rely on
income-related benefits can be cut while moderate earners will
be encouraged to make a better second pension for themselves.
To assist the lower paid under the new proposals, the
government proposes to double the value of payments on earnings up to £9,000 a year and to treat contributing employees
earning up to £9,000 a year as if they had earned £9,000 a
year when their new state Second Pension is calculated. Carers
will be credited into the new state Second Pension as if they
had earnings of £9,000 a year.16 1 Moderate earners will be
assisted by the doubling of the new minimum level on their

PAPER, supra note 8, at ch. 5, para. 9.
,..The government has commissioned researchers to examine why entitlement
claims were not being made and has undertaken pilot schemes to attempt to identify entitled claimants and to encourage them to claim. Reasons for not claiming
included stigma, lack of information and perceived difficulty and complexity of
claims procedure. The government has decided to refine its techniques to attempt
to identify those who may be entitled to claim more accurately, to encourage
claims to be made especially where some stigma or uncertainty may otherwise
arise and to attempt to make claims to Income Support in particular, triggered on
as automatic a basis as possible. See GREEN PAPER, supra note 8, at ch. 5, paras.
12-17.
1" While SERPS is efficient, it is earnings-related which fails to assist those on
low incomes. See GOODE REPORT, supra note 8, at ch. 6, para. 3.
' See GREEN PAPER, supra note 8, at ch. 6, paras. 9, 12.
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first £9,000 of earnings which will be gradually increased until
their earnings reach £18,500. Between the levels of £9,000 and
£18,500, rebates will be increased to encourage the taking out
of funded pensions through either occupational, private or
stakeholder schemes. Thus, it is expected that funded pensions
will eventually replace the state Second Pension for all moderate and higher earners at which point the state Second Pension will operate on a fiat-rate basis only for those on lower
earnings. 162 It is expected that the immediate increase in the
amount provided for lower earners up to £9,000 a year will be
worth almost £50 a week.
The new state Second Pension proposal is important although some confusion may arise with regard to the distinction
between a first and second tier pension. The first tier will
remain non-earnings related; the second tier will be paid in
return for work undertaken although the fiat-rate nature of
the final scheme proposed may be somewhat misleading. Both
will operate on an actual or accredited flat-rate basis with
former employees supplementing their basic state pension with
the new state Second Pension. Others will have to continue to
rely on income support and similar benefits if they do not otherwise qualify for a pension.
Of even greater importance are the incentives which will
be incorporated to encourage people to move from the state
Second Pension to a funded scheme. Specifically, the levels of
rebates to be provided are of particular relevance. While a
rebate-related incentive system has been in place for some
time, the new element is the inclusion of the option to enter
into a stakeholder pension where an occupational pension
scheme is not available. This option acts as an alternative to a
more expensive privately-funded scheme. Much more clarification will, however, be required in this area, especially with
regard to such matters as funding and administration costs. To
the extent that the costs of employers are substantially increased, this may, of course, have a significant impact on the
initial employment opportunities created and will have to be
carefully monitored.

62 See GREEN PAPER, supra note 8, at ch. 6, paras. 10, 11.

1998]

UNITED INGDOMPENSIONS LAW REFORM

C. Stakeholder Pension
The objective of the stakeholder pension scheme proposals
are to extend the availability of funded pensions to moderate
and higher earners. The U.K. government asserts that many
existing pension arrangements are often unsuitable or expensive. It, therefore, has introduced a new, flexible, value-formoney scheme to allow more middle earners to save for retirement. Although the market value of occupational pension
funds is in excess of £640 billion with a further £190 billion
invested in personal pension schemes, the former are not available to many employed and/or self-employed 16 while significant disincentives, especially with regard to administrative
costs, discourage greater use of the latter. Accordingly, the
U.K. government modernised its pension system by creating a
new, flexible, cost-effective alternative scheme.
The government also wants to ensure that people have
confidence in the security and running of the new schemes,
that more efficient access to pensions is provided and that the
habit of saving either through long-term pension schemes or
through the new separate Individual Savings Accounts ("ISA"),
which has also been proposed, is promoted."M The target
group for the new stakeholder pensions are principally those
earning between £9,000 and £20,000 a year. 165 However,
while many people earning over £20,000 generally already
make additional pension provision, it is thought that they too
will be able to benefit from the lower charges, greater flexibility and simpler tax regime which will apply to the new stakeholder pension scheme. 66
The government's proposals with regard to stakeholder
schemes are designed to remove the complexity relating to
personal pensions schemes,'67 to ensure that buyers received
"6 Thirty five percent (35%) of employees were not covered by any occupational
scheme. See GREEN PAPER, supra note 8, at ch. 7, para. 5.
1 See GREEN PAPER, supra note 8, at ch. 7, para. 8.
15 This group includes around 10.7 million people, half of which are already
participating in occupational schemes. Of the 5.3 million not in occupational
schemes, it is estimated that around 2.5 million contribute to personal pensions
with 1 million in personal pensions but only contributing the rebate from their
National Insurance contributions. See GREEN PAPER, supra note 8, at ch. 7, para.
11.
See GREEN PAPER, supra note 8, at ch. 7, para. 10.
'
Many personal schemes have complex charging structures depending upon
1
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a good deal, 6 ' and to reduce the costs of regulation16 and
the costs of distributing and marketing schemes. 7 ' Specifically, the marketing costs generally associated with personal pensions will be reduced by making stakeholder schemes as simple
and cost-effective as possible. This will be achieved by requiring employers who do not already offer occupational scheme
facilities to make stakeholder schemes available to their employees and to make necessary payments by deduction from
their employees' wages. The requirement to be imposed on the
35 percent of non-occupational scheme contributing employers
to make separate stakeholder facilities available to employees
is possibly the most significant new development in this area.
With regard to the scope of coverage of stakeholder
schemes, employees who are eligible for occupational schemes
and employees whose earnings fall below the National Insurance LEL will be excluded. Whether all other employers will be
required to participate on a compulsory or voluntary basis is,
however, still unclear. Although the government is interested
in introducing the scheme on as wide a basis as possible, it has
stated that it is concerned about the potential burdens which
will fall on employers with a limited number of employees who
are mostly low-paid and likely to be better off in the new state
Second Pension. 7 1 Opinion was accordingly invited as to
whether access should be on a voluntary basis for some groups
of employers.

the amount paid and the duration of the investment. Stakeholder schemes will be
standardised insofar as possible in accordance with certain minimum standards to
provide both a minimum level of protection and clarity in their operations. See
GREEN PAPER, supra note 8, at ch. 7, paras. 17, 18.
" Control of the operation of many personal pensions schemes is constrained
by the limited powers of members and restrictions on their ability to move to
other service providers. It is accordingly proposed that stakeholder schemes be run
in a manner which will fully protect the interests of members. See GREEN PAPER,
supra note 8, at ch. 7, paras. 19, 20.
...As many of the costs involved with private pensions arose through marketing and providing investment advice, it is hoped that the costs associated with
stakeholder pensions can be reduced by focusing on administration rather than
sales with a higher degree of protection being made available through the minimum standards to be introduced and the requirement that the schemes are run in
their members' interests. See GREEN PAPER, supra note 8, at ch. 7, paras. 21, 22.
170 See GREEN PAPER, supra note 8, at ch. 7, paras. 23, 24.
17 See GREEN PAPER, supra note 8, at ch. 7, para. 56.
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Stakeholder pension schemes will use a collective structure, as with occupational schemes, to ensure the best valuefor-the-money for scheme members. As at present, OPRA will
be responsible for the regulation of all trust-based stakeholder
FSA will continue to be responsible for
pension schemes.'
the marketing of schemes and any related investment advice
while firms responsible for the managing of funds will be
authorised and supervised by FSA.'73 Members of stakeholder pensions schemes will have access to the Pensions Ombudsman in the event of maladministration by trustees and to the
Financial Services Ombudsman with regard to complaints
about inappropriate advice or promotional material.
The legislation required to create the stakeholder pension
scheme will be included in the Welfare Reform Bill which will
be presented to Parliament in the current session. Detailed
aspects concerning the operation of the scheme will then be
developed through secondary legislation after the bill has received Royal Assent. It is intended that the first stakeholder
pension schemes will be set up as of April 2001.
CONCLUSION

A number of complex issues clearly arise in designing the
proper structure and detailed method of operation for any new
system of modern pension provision. In light of the very distinct needs and available resources of all of the people involved, many systems will have to continue to proceed on a
structured or tiered basis whereby different sub-schemes with
separate conditions of entitlement, funding and payment rules
will have to remain in place. Each of these sub-systems must,
however, be continually reviewed and revised over time to
ensure that all savings and support needs are satisfied in light
of the current economic, social and fiscal regimes in place in
any particular country.

The main provisions in the Pensions Act of 1995 will be applied to stakeholder schemes including the production of annual reports and accounts, the appointment of professional advisers, the drawing up a statement of investment
principles and the maintenance of procedures for dealing with internal disputes.
See GREEN PAPER, supra note 8, at ch. 7, para. 42.
173See GREEN PAPER, supra note 8, at ch. 7, paras. 40, 41.
172
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Despite all of the well-intended political initiatives
launched and other proposals for reform developed in the United Kingdom, however, a number of difficult issues remain to be
resolved in the revision of the current system. The basic framework adopted to date provides a sound basis for the development of adequate pension provision for many pensioners although a number of gaps and difficulties remain which must
be corrected. All instances of pensioner poverty must, in particular, be immediately eradicated. Full provision must be
made available to all pensioners in need either through the
basic state pension or Social Security-related payments with
the value of these payments being protected over time. Pensioners who do attempt to make some provision for themselves
should not be penalised by obscure benefit or support rules.
The system should encourage rather than punish personal
provision and be revised accordingly.
With regard to larger systems reform, the government's
most recent proposals which were set out in its December 1998
Green Paper are important new developments and have to be
strongly welcomed. The improved basic state pension and new
state Second Pension will provide considerable additional assistance for low earners and carers in retirement. Although
some concerns have been expressed with regard to the amount
of actual coverage which will be provided, it can only be hoped
that the government will listen to the views expressed during
the consultation period and act accordingly.
The new stakeholder schemes will also create an important new alternative to existing occupational and private pension arrangements. The incentives introduced to encourage
middle earners to move from the state Second Pension into
funded pensions are particularly welcome although it remains
to be seen how effective they will be in practice. Particular
difficulties may arise with regard to the lack of compulsion
involved as well as with the complexity of the new arrangements proposed. It has to be hoped that the new stakeholder
schemes will be as flexible, secure and popular as intended.
Much of the detail surrounding their structure and operation,
however, has still to be confirmed.
In so far as some of the more successful aspects of the
current system are to be retained, especially through the continued availability of occupational and private schemes, it is
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essential to ensure that these operate in an effective manner
and are not prejudiced by the new measures proposed. Concerns have already been expressed that the longer term availability of occupational and private schemes may be substantially threatened following the introduction of the new stakeholder arrangements. The availability of independent pensions
advice may also be reduced at a time when the system is becoming considerably more, rather than less, complicated. Having decided to keep much of the present system in place, the
government must take care to ensure that the existing advantages or benefits produced are not unnecessarily undermined
by the new measures proposed.
In addition, the new initiatives will have to be supported
by the pensions industry although much may depend upon the
perceived income which they may be able to generate. Employers in medium and smaller-sized companies will also have to
assume more responsibility with regard to the development of
the new schemes. This will clearly increase employer costs, at
least initially, although incidental benefits will be available
both by attracting more employees and by employers using the
same schemes themselves. The difficulty that arises, however,
is that the largest burden of change may have to be borne by
employers least able to assume the costs involved. It can only
be hoped that these proposals will not act to discourage the
employment of staff-lower paid staff in particular-in smaller
businesses or otherwise interfere with these businesses possibly already-limited profitability. The government will have to
take a proper lead in this regard and be sensitive to the new
difficulties created.
The government must also ensure that all public and private schemes are subject to effective supervision and control.
Significant progress has been made in this area with many of
the detailed recommendations contained in the Goode Report
being implemented under the Pensions Act of 1995. This work
must be continued. A proper control framework which fully
recognises and protects the interests of all parties must be in
place and operate effectively at all times.
Proper pension provision remains an issue of fundamental
social importance. Politicians, economists, lawyers and other
social commentators must continue to examine and revise
existing arrangements to ensure that effective savings and
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funding mechanisms are in place and that proper pension
provision is secured for all over time. While some valuable
recent initiatives have been undertaken in this regard in the
United Kingdom, this work must now be taken forward further
for the benefit of all of those effected and for society as a
whole.

